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Article
Educational Accommodation and Distributive Equity:
The Principle of Proportionate Progress
TALHA SYED
What do we owe students who, on account of disability, have differential needs
and capacities from others? What, for that matter, do we owe all students? A central
claim of the present Article is that we cannot answer the former question without
also considering the latter. Moreover, a satisfactory answer requires reaching
beyond notions of “equality of opportunity,” to probe our deepest commitments
regarding distributive equity, or substantive fairness in access to the good of
educational development. This Article offers a novel understanding of these deepest
commitments, to advance a new principle of distributive justice, the principle of
proportionate priority. It pursues the implications of this principle in depth for the
specific setting of educational accommodation for disability—to provide a
comprehensive answer to a question recently before the Supreme Court. Its
ramifications extend, however, far more widely, not only for educational policy in
general, but also for other areas of law and policy.
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Educational Accommodation and Distributive Equity:
The Principle of Proportionate Progress
TALHA SYED *
INTRODUCTION
What does fair educational opportunity mean for students who, on
account of disability, have differential needs and capacities from others?
For more than thirty years, this question has stymied courts and
commentators in their efforts to determine the appropriate scope and guiding
principles of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).1
While the law entitles eligible students to individualized education programs
that provide “adequate” educational benefit,2 what counts as adequate has
never been satisfactorily answered. Indeed, the question was recently again
before the United States Supreme Court, which had decided—in the face of
unflagging controversy and a circuit split over its landmark 1982 decision,
Board of Education v. Rowley3—to revisit its own prior efforts in this
regard.4

*
University of California, Berkeley School of Law. This Article has had a long period of gestation.
The principle of distributive justice advanced here was first presented at the Petrie-Flom Bioethics and
Health Law & Policy Seminar at Harvard Law School in 2008, and I thank the Petrie-Flom Center for its
generous support of that research. Subsequent iterations of the argument have been presented at faculty
talks at the University of Colorado, University of Seattle, Emory University, UCLA, UC Berkeley, UC
Davis, University of Michigan, USC Gould and UT Austin law schools, as well as the Bay Area Forum
for Law & Ethics (BAFFLE), the Law & Politics seminar at Tel Aviv University, and health law seminars
at Harvard University, the University of Colorado, and the University of Tulsa. Thanks to participants
on those occasions for helpful feedback and discussion. For specific comments on prior presentations of
the argument, thanks to Afra Asharipour, Yishai Blank, Anupam Chander, Norm Daniels, Einer Elhauge,
Leslie Francis, Jasmine Harris, Niko Kolodney, Roy Kreitner, Chris Kutz, Gillian Lester, David
Lieberman, Orly Lobel, Arnulf Becker Lorca, Lisa Ikemoto, Arti Rai, Eric Rakowski, Larry Sager,
Shayak Sardar, Anita Silvers, Sarah Song, Madhavi Sunder, Jay Wallace, and Dennis Ventry. For helpful
feedback on a written draft, thanks to Yochai Benkler, Glenn Cohen, Meir Dan-Cohen, Terry Fisher,
Darien Shanske, Steve Sugarman, and Aaron Tang. Oren Bracha, Anna di Robilant, and Roni Mann went
above and beyond in their extremely close engagement with the argument of the Article, and for that I
owe a very special thanks. My deepest gratitude is to Saki Bailey.
1
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 (2012).
2
See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
3
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley (Rowley II), 458 U.S. 176 (1982). See generally infra Part I.A (reviewing
the circuit split and controversy in the wake of Rowley II).
4
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). This Article
was completed before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Endrew. As discussed in the
Afterword, the Court’s decision only serves to underline the significance of the Analysis offered here.
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This Article offers a comprehensive answer, by advancing a new
principle of distributive justice. It first reconceives the issue of adequate
benefits as one of distributive equity, rather than nondiscrimination or
equality of opportunity. The central problem posed by adequate benefits is
neither: (a) to secure similar treatment for those similarly situated by
removing illegitimate barriers to formal equality of opportunity; nor even,
(b) to secure “fair” equality of opportunity by tailoring otherwise-legitimate
procedural requirements for those differentially situated.5 Rather, it is to
secure students effective access to a substantive benefit: educational
development. When it comes to formative education, our aspiration is best
conceived in terms not only of “leveling the playing field” to ensure a truly
fair process of competition, but also of securing fair access to educational
development, seen as an intrinsically valuable good for each student.
Students with a disability are differentially situated in respect of that purpose
because, in the language of distributive justice, they face a “conversion
deficit”: a deficit in translating a given bundle of means (educational
resources) into valuable ends (educational development).6 Our aim is to
correct for the insensitivity of formal equality of resources to their special
needs, so as to secure them substantively fair access to educational
development. And in doing so, there is no plausible alternative to addressing
this head-on as a question of distributive equity: a question, that is, of
prioritizing among similarly legitimate claims to resources—both the special
needs of students with disability and the needs of other students—for the
sake of securing all students fair access to the good of educational
development.7
What, then, is a fair distribution of educational resources—one that
provides students with disability equitable access to the good of educational
development, by attending simultaneously both to their special needs and to
the similarly legitimate claims of other students?
The Article first examines existing answers to this question,
reconstructing current judicial standards and scholarly proposals into
principles of distributive equity. Does fair access require equality in overall
educational development? Does it require equality in access to educational
improvements? Does it require maximizing overall levels—either of all
students, those worst off, or those with disability? Does it require
maximizing improvements across students? Or, does it simply require
ensuring that each student can attain a decent basic level of development
and, if so, how robust or minimal a level should we aim for?
5
As may be the case, for example, with accommodating disability in employment settings. See infra
notes 106, 117 and accompanying text.
6
See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 28–29, 33–34 (1992).
7
This might be thought to overlook the “disparate impact” branch of antidiscrimination law, but,
as discussed below, disparate-impact analysis as it has developed in the context of disability
accommodation sheds little added light here. See infra Part I.B.2.
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Versions of each of these principles presently lurk within the existing
legal standards, as stated in their current, ambiguous forms. Rendering these
standards’ tacit distributive directives more explicit and precise allows us,
first, to identify more clearly and thus assess more crisply their concrete
implications in different cases. Even more importantly, it enables us to go
deeper and unearth and reflect upon the underlying notions of fairness upon
which these standards ultimately rest.
Subjecting existing principles to such critical examination, we find that
each founders on its troubling implications in an important subset of cases.
Some fail to give adequate consideration to the costs of further educational
improvements for those with disability; others, to the greater urgency of
improvements for those remaining much worse off than others; and still
others, to both. And in each case these defects on the surface stem,
ultimately, from deeper flaws in the premises underlying the principles—in
their most basic commitments concerning distributive fairness. Reflecting
the reigning views in distributive justice theory more generally, each of these
principles rests ultimately on one of three commitments: equality,
sufficiency, or maximization.
This Article advances a new answer to the question, in contrast to the
reigning principles grounded in equality, sufficiency, or maximization.8
It does so by arguing for a deep shift at the level of our most fundamental
commitments in matters of distributive fairness—to generate, at the surface,
a new principle of distributive justice that persuasively handles the full range
of cases we face.
The central claim of the Article is that, in matters of distributive justice,
our general commitment to equal concern in political morality is best
understood not to require, even as a default, any commitment to equalizing
as valuable for its own sake.9 Rather, it should be understood as a
commitment to enabling each person’s life to go as well as is possible and
fair. And what is fair is that those who are, through no fault of their own,
worse off than others be given priority because they are worse off. This is
not because we aim to decrease inequality for its own sake,10 but rather
because gains for a person, or improvements in her or his life, have greater
8

This includes “prioritarian” principles, which generalize the sufficiency view with their notion of
non-comparative priority. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
9
This is in contrast to the most influential views in distributive justice theory. See JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 54–55, 130–31 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999) (1971) (adopting as a default
premise a commitment to distributional equality); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 11–14 (2000)
(analyzing distributive justice in terms of two competing theories of distributional equality); SEN, supra
note 6, at 12–16 (justifying equality as the starting premise for distributive justice). See generally infra
Part II.A.1 (critically evaluating the “telic equality” view that distributional equality is valuable in itself).
10
Inequality may remain important for instrumental reasons. See infra note 142 (identifying distinct
reasons why distributional equality may remain instrumentally valuable even after rejection of its
intrinsic value).
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moral significance the lower her or his overall level is compared to that of
other potential recipients. Why? Because it speaks directly to the question
of fairness, of what it is reasonable to ask separate persons, leading distinct
lives, to expect from and sacrifice for each other. Although equalizing does
not hold out any intrinsic value, nevertheless when deciding between two
potential recipients of resources, it is only reasonable that one whose life is
already going better than another’s understand that improvements for the
latter matter more—are of greater significance or urgency—precisely
because they are improvements to a life that is going less well.11
Moreover, just as equalizing for its own sake holds no value, so
maximization for its own sake—irrespective of its impact across distinct
lives—is implausible. And while a focus on ensuring that all persons attain
a sufficiently “decent” threshold level is initially more plausible, it finally
proves untenable as well, because what is decent is ultimately contextual to
what is possible for others and hence to what is fair.
Making this shift in the fundamental reason for our special concern for
those with disability sheds new light in determining the extent of that
concern, or how much priority is merited. Since students with disability are
given priority because they are worse off, they are to be given priority to the
extent that they are worse off. They are to be given, in other words,
comparative priority: their claims on educational resources are greater the
worse off they are compared to other potential student recipients.
This then issues in the principle of proportionate progress: students with
disability should have priority in access to educational resources so long as
(a) the progress that these resources would enable them to realize, as a
proportion of their existing level of development, is greater than or equal to
(b) the progress such resources would enable alternative recipients to realize,
as a proportion of their existing levels of development. Under the principle,
those who are at comparatively lower levels are given greater priority, which
priority is applied to their respective potentials for improvement. Where the
two factors of comparative priority and potentials converge, the recipient is
given especially strong priority.
What matters on this view is neither to equalize the overall levels of all
students, nor to maximize or “sufficientize” the levels of students with
disability; nor, for that matter, is it to equalize or maximize improvements
across all students. Rather, it is to ensure that all students have access to
meaningful improvements. And the meaning of improvements is to be
understood inter-subjectively, within and across different students’
educational lives, in terms both of how well or badly they are already doing
11
As elaborated below, it is precisely adoption of a comparative view, but now on grounds of
fairness rather than equalizing, that distinguishes the present position not only from “equality” views on
one side, but also, on the other, from non-comparative “priority” and “sufficiency” views. See infra notes
143 and 161 and accompanying text.
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and of how much or little they stand to improve. Educational gains are to be
understood, that is, in terms of their interpersonal significance: what they
signify for each person in the context of her or his own development,
compared to what the alternative gains for others would signify for them, in
the context of their own development.
How does the principle make sense of existing law? Very well.
Competing legal standards each emphasize, in a one-sided manner, some
partial set of considerations, including: the infeasibility of maximal benefits,
especially in cases of severe disability; the implausibility of modest benefits,
especially in cases of great potential; the need to be sensitive to costs; and
the need to be sensitive to student diversity.12 By contrast to any alternative
principle, the proportionate-progress view organically gives—internal to its
own commitments—each consideration its due, and thus takes them all into
account in a systematic—that is, comprehensive and consistent—way.13
Moreover, it does so in the right way: evaluating levels in terms of
comparative priority and improvements in terms of comparative potential,
so as to integrate them into an analysis of equitable opportunity costs.
The Article turns, in its final part, to consider how the principle may
apply in complex cases of educational accommodation. This requires taking
up the second fundamental debate in distributive justice theory—concerning
not the appropriate principle of distributive equity, but the appropriate space
of distributive concern. In core cases of accommodation, disability causes
the student to perform below the average. But what if, as is sometimes the
case, the student is able to make up for the disadvantage, to achieve results
on par with, or even superior to, the average? Do there remain grounds for
special accommodation in such cases? Most courts think not, taking the view
that when students are average or above, their disabilities can no longer be
said to “adversely affect” their “educational performance” for purposes of
IDEA eligibility.14 Some, however, disagree, taking the view that so long as
the disability may be discerned to have any detrimental effect on
performance, it “adversely affects” it so as to merit accommodation even if
the student is overall performing at an average or higher level.15 Both
positions, so stated, are unsatisfactory and the debate between them lacks
traction—starting and ending on rival premises concerning the meaning of
“adversely affect.” Is there a way beyond the impasse? Yes. Seen through
the lens of distributive justice theory, each position inchoately tracks a
distinct view of the appropriate “index” of educational advantage for
distributive concern. Evaluating each in light of the larger debate on that
12

As reviewed infra Part I.
See infra Part II.B.4.
14
See infra notes 193–196 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases that find
above-average students to be ineligible for special educational services).
15
See infra notes 198–201 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases that allow even
above-average students to receive special educational services).
13
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score—featuring the rival candidates of welfare, resources, and
capabilities—clarifies the substantive stakes of their disagreement and
works toward its resolution, by specifying more precisely the target space of
educational advantage to which the principle of proportionate priority should
apply.
The Article intervenes at two fundamental levels. First, at the level of
normative first principle, it offers a new elaboration of our deepest
commitments of distributive fairness, to result in a new principle of
distributive justice that persuasively addresses the full range of cases—with
implications for many areas of law and policy. Second, at the level of
legal-institutional analysis, the Article develops in depth the implications of
this principle for a specific domain of legal policy, to provide a persuasive
and comprehensive answer to a question recently before the Supreme Court.
It does so by reconceiving educational opportunity as an issue of “equitable
access,” requiring an analysis sounding in distributive equity.
The reconceptualization itself offers three significant contributions. The
first is to locate the source of the longstanding intractability of the problem
of adequate benefits—one that has stymied both courts and commentators
for more than thirty years—in the failure to confront the distributive the
character of the question, and hence to adopt the mode of analysis needed
for its satisfactory resolution. Second, viewing existing legal positions
through the lens of distributive justice allows us to formulate more precisely
the actual directives lurking within them, and thus to evaluate more
crisply—with greater clarity and depth—their requirements across the range
of cases. This applies both to different standards for core cases of
accommodation—which are best understood as inchoately embodying
different principles of distributive equity—and the debate in complex cases,
where the contending views are best understood as inchoately tracking
distinct positions concerning the appropriate space of distributive concern.
For both, the analytical framework of distributive justice theory throws
floodlights of clarity on the substantive stakes of the problem and normative
premises underpinning different solutions. Finally, the particular way in
which educational opportunity is reconceived—as requiring equitable
access to educational development—resonates with widely held, if
inarticulate, commitments in this area. Rethinking our aim here in terms of
equity of access moves us beyond precisely the impasse articulated by the
Supreme Court in Rowley, namely that our aspirations in this context are not
well captured by either equality of opportunity or equality of outcome.16
Each of these fundamental arguments—of reconceiving a question of
legal policy as one of delimited distributive equity and advancing a new
principle of distributive justice to aid in its resolution—bear significance for
many areas of law and policy besides educational accommodation for
16

See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
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disability. The Conclusion briefly canvasses three: educational policy in
general, disability accommodation outside of education, and equitable
access to healthcare.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes the current landscape
of law and policy in educational accommodation. It reviews the intractability
of the problem of adequate benefits from Rowley to today, diagnoses its
source in the failure of courts and commentators to confront its distributive
character, and reconceives the question as one of distributive equity. Part II
then reconstructs existing and proposed legal standards as principles of
distributive equity, and evaluates them using an in-depth illustrative case of
IDEA accommodation. It next advances the principle of proportionate
priority, as rooted in the most compelling elaboration of our deepest
commitments in this area, and as providing the most persuasive resolution
across the full spectrum of cases. Part III examines the principle’s
application in complex cases of accommodation, taking up the second
fundamental debate in distributive justice theory, concerning the proper
index of advantage for distributive concern. The Conclusion points to the
wider significance of the new principle of distributive justice, for other areas
of law and policy.17
I. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE IN EDUCATIONAL ACCOMMODATION
Students with learning disabilities are entitled, under the IDEA, to a
“free appropriate public education,” in the form of an “individualized
education program” (IEP) that provides “special education” and “related
services.”18 Developed in consultation with the child’s parents, an IEP is to
be devised by the local educational agency upon a thorough evaluation of
the student’s educational needs.19 It must be suitably tailored to the student’s
particular needs, and place her or him in the “least restrictive environment”
appropriate to meeting such needs.20 Removal from the regular classroom
environment is to occur only when the character or severity of the student’s
disability means that simply adding supplementary aids and services to the
regular classroom will not suffice.21
Alongside these formal and procedural requirements, an IEP must also
satisfy a more substantive obligation, of providing access to some positive
amount of educational benefit.22 Each IEP must, that is, be reasonably
17
Following the Conclusion is a brief Afterword that considers how the Article’s analysis bears on
the recently delivered Supreme Court opinion in the Endrew case.
18
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1), 1401(3)(A), 1401(9), 1412(a)(1), 1412(a)(4) (2012).
19
Id. at § 1414(a)–(c).
20
Id. at § 1414(d); § 1412(a)(5).
21
34 C.F.R. §300.114(a)(2)(ii) (2016).
22
See Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982) (articulating a two-pronged test for IDEA
compliance: “First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the
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calculated to provide the student access to an “adequate” educational
benefit.23 It is on this question—access to what amount of educational
benefit should be deemed adequate for purposes of the IDEA—that our
attention is trained. And it is one that has been subject to intense and
unflagging judicial and scholarly controversy.
A. The IDEA’s Persistent Puzzle: How Much is “Adequate”?
1. Rowley and Its Aftermath
Leading the way is the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Rowley. At
issue was the suitability of an IEP for first-grader Amy Rowley, a deaf
student with minimal residual hearing and excellent lip-reading skills.24
Placed in a regular first-grade classroom, Amy was provided with the
supplements of a hearing aid, one hour of special instruction each day from
a tutor for the deaf, and three hours per week of speech therapy.25 Although
she was achieving above-average grades under this plan, Amy’s parents
nevertheless believed that she was failing to reach her full potential on
account of missing too much of what was going on in class by relying on lip
reading (notwithstanding her proficiency in that regard).26 Accordingly, they
requested that the school provide her an interpreter for all her classes.27 The
school refused, pointing to Amy’s satisfactory, indeed above-average,
progress.28

individualized educational program developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits?”); cf. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F.,
118 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1997) (glossing Rowley II’s second prong into four factors: “(1) the program
is individualized on the basis of the student’s assessment and performance; (2) the program is
administered in the least restrictive environment; (3) the services are provided in a coordinated and
collaborative manner by the key ‘stakeholders’; and (4) positive academic and non-academic benefits are
demonstrated”).
23
Rowley II, 458 U.S. at 202, 207. Courts and commentators often use the terms “adequate” and
“appropriate” interchangeably when referring to the type of special education an IEP must provide to
satisfy the IDEA’s requirements. In this Article, however, the terms will be taken to have distinct
meanings. “Appropriate” will be taken as the more general term, to refer to an IEP that is overall
satisfactory, meeting both the formal and substantive requirements involved in providing a “free and
appropriate education.” “Adequate,” on the other hand, will be used in a more restrictive sense, to single
out the substantive element of the IDEA, regarding the required amount of educational benefit to be
provided, as distinct from requirements concerning the process (e.g., stakeholder consultation) and
manner (e.g., least-restrictive environment) for determining and providing such benefits. Cf. Roland v.
Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 991, 993–94 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing under the heading of
“adequacy and appropriateness” the distinct roles of the amount of benefit and manner in which it is
provided).
24
Rowley II, 458 U.S. at 184.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
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A federal district court disagreed with the school. Despite her aboveaverage performance, Amy, the court found, “understands considerably less
of what goes on than she could if she were not deaf.”29 Consequently, there
was ample room for improvement with an interpreter. Since on the court’s
view an “appropriate education” was one that afforded Amy “an opportunity
to achieve [her] full potential,”30 failure to provide her an interpreter fell
considerably short of the required standard.
In overturning, the Supreme Court rejected the district court’s “full
potential” standard,31 declaring that the IDEA did not require “strict equality
of opportunity or services;”32 or, indeed, mandate access to any “particular
level of education.”33 Rather, it aimed simply to ensure a “basic floor of
opportunity,” so as to provide students with disability effective, rather than
merely formal, “access” to public education.34 Lest this “opportunity”
language be taken in a purely procedural vein, the Court did clarify that there
was a substantive component to the Act’s requirements.35 Although a focus
on any required maximum or minimum level of educational attainment was
misplaced, nevertheless an IEP did need to be “reasonably calculated”36 to
confer access to “some educational benefit.”37
What satisfies this “some benefit” test was, however, left unclear. The
Court explicitly declined to specify “any one test for determining the
adequacy of education benefits.”38 And although one factor featured
prominently in the Court’s discussion—namely, whether the IEP “enable[d]
the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade”—this
was expressly stated not to be conclusive as sufficient in all cases (nor,
perhaps, even always necessary).39 The Court held only that in the case
before it, the fact that Amy was not only passing but also in the upper half
of her class, did indicate enough of a benefit.40 Going forward, the Court left
the “difficult problem” of specifying “when handicapped children are
receiving sufficient educational benefits” to case-by-case determination.41

29

Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. (Rowley I), 483 F. Supp. 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 534.
31
Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 186 (1982).
32
Id. at 198.
33
Id. at 192.
34
Id. at 200.
35
See id. at 200–01 (“It would do little good for Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing
access to a public education only to have the handicapped child receive no benefit from that education.”).
36
Id. at 204.
37
Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
38
See id. at 202 (“We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy
of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act.”).
39
Id. at 204.
40
Id. at 209–10.
41
Id. at 202.
30
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Courts have, in the wake of Rowley, struggled to interpret and apply its
standard. Three main positions have emerged.42
A slight majority of circuits have hewed closely to the “some benefit”
formulation.43 Central to this approach is an emphasis against any
requirement that schools provide students with disability an optimal
education, one that would maximize their potential,44 or that schools enable
them to attain any other substantive level, such as “self-sufficiency.”45
Rather, so long as access is provided to a serviceable set of benefits—a
“Chevrolet not a Cadillac”46—the requirement is deemed to be met, even if
an alternative IEP would secure the student greater progress.47

42

See Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of How Rowley Has
Been Interpreted, 247 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP.1, 1–4 (Oct. 1, 2009) (describing how the circuit courts have
interpreted the Rowley standard in a series of cases).
43
See id. at 1–4 (collecting sources establishing that the “majority of the circuits courts, the First,
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh and District of Columbia, have exclusively applied the ‘some
educational benefit’ standard”). The pattern has largely held in subsequent case law, with the possible
exception of the First Circuit. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1,
798 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017); TM ex rel. SM v. Gwinnet Cty.
Sch. Dist., 646 F. App’x 763, 764 (11th Cir. 2016) (affirming the district court’s application of the “some”
benefit standard); D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying
“meaningful” benefit standard, but also invoking cases and language associated with the “some” benefit
standard); M.B. ex rel. Berns v. Hamilton S.E. Sch., 668 F.3d 851, 860 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying “some
educational benefit” standard); Sumter Cty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan ex rel. TH, 642 F.3d 478, 483–84
(4th Cir. 2011) (applying “some educational benefit” standard); CB ex rel. BB v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1
Minneapolis, Minn., 636 F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying “some educational benefit” standard).
44
See C.B. ex rel. B.B., 636 F.3d at 989 (“The statute does not require a school district to ‘maximize
a student’s potential or provide the best possible education at public expense.’”); Hartmann ex rel.
Hartmann v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 996, 1001 (4th Cir. 1997) (“States must . . . confer
some educational benefit upon the handicapped child, but the Act does not require the furnishing of every
special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s potential.”) (internal citations omitted);
Kerkam ex rel. Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Public Sch., 931 F.2d 84, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“The Act
does not require that a placement maximize the potential of the handicapped child.”).
45
Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 201 n.23 (1982); Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P.,
540 F.3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008).
46
See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459–60 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that the IDEA
requires that “schools provide the educational equivalent of a serviceable Chevrolet to every handicapped
student. . . . [T]he Board is not required to provide a Cadillac”); J.L. v. Francis Howell R-3 Sch. Dist.,
693 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1014 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (“The Act requires only that a student receive sufficient
specialized services to benefit from his education.” (citing Doe, 9 F.3d at 459–60)); Fayetteville-Parry
Local Sch. Dist., 20 IDELR 1289, 1302 (SEA Ohio March 8, 1994) (“The argument has been made that,
under Rowley, public schools are not required to maximize the potential of handicapped children. Stated
another way, ‘public schools are not required to provide a Cadillac when a Chevrolet will do.’” (citations
omitted)).
47
See O’Toole ex rel. O’Toole v. Olathe Dist. Sch. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 144 F.3d 692, 708
(10th Cir. 1998) (“The fact that [the student] made more progress, and by her parents’ account was
happier, at the CID, does not compel the conclusion that the CID was the appropriate placement for her
under the IDEA and Kansas law, and that her IEP as implemented at SEC was inappropriate.”);
Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 133 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding an IEP is not inadequate
“simply because parents show that a child makes better progress in a different program”); Kerkam,
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What this precisely means in particular cases has, however, remained
very unclear.48 For instance, although courts under this standard have often
relied on advancement from grade to grade as a strong indicator of adequate
benefit,49 others have distanced themselves from any such proxy test,50
pointing to the explicit language and facts of Rowley that suggest the
contrary.51
A second position has been staked out by the Third Circuit, which has
emphasized that it is not enough for a school to provide de minimis or
“trivial” benefits, especially in cases where the student shows considerable
potential.52 Rather, the benefits must be “meaningful” rather than merely
“some.”53 The leading case, Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit
16, drew support for its “meaningful benefits” formulation from the IDEA’s
legislative history and the following statement in Rowley: “Congress did not
impose upon the States any greater substantive educational benefit than
would be necessary to make such access meaningful.”54 Clearly, the shift
from “some” to “meaningful” is meant to signal a strengthening of the
requirement. Especially since it is accompanied by a shift in emphasis,
931 F.2d at 86 (holding that the view that where a student is “making progress . . . any inferior placement
was not appropriate” is “inconsistent with the ‘some educational benefit’ standard of Rowley”).
48
Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law,
2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 561, 565 (2003) (“Despite a myriad of court decisions on the topic, school
districts, parents, and courts still have little guidance on how to assess FAPE or educational benefit.”).
49
See Todd v. Duneland Sch. Corp., 299 F.3d 899, 905–06 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding that an IEP
satisfies the IDEA when the disabled child advances “from grade level to grade level while at [public]
school”); MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty., 303 F.3d 523, 532 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n
important measure of an IEP’s success is whether the disabled child has made progress on the basis of
objective criteria” such as “passing marks and advancement from grade to grade”); Fort Zumwalt Sch.
Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that advancement from grade to grade was an
important factor in proving that the disabled child received some benefit from his public education);
Doe v. Ala. State Dep’t. of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 666 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that the “IEP afforded
substantial educational benefits in that John received tutoring in several subject matter areas and received
passing grades in those areas”); Parent ex rel. Student v. Osceola Cty. Sch. Bd., 59 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1249
(M.D. Fla. 1999) (noting that the student “progressed through the educational system earning passing
grades in all his courses”).
50
See In re Conklin v. Anne Arundel Cty. Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 306, 314 (1991) (“[A] child’s
ability or inability to achieve such [passing] marks and progress does not automatically resolve the
inquiry where the ‘free appropriate public education’ requirement is concerned.”).
51
See R.B., ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2007)
(observing that Rowley holds “merely advancing from grade to grade does not automatically satisfy the
IDEA”); Hall ex rel. Hall v. Vance Cty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that
Rowley holds “no single substantive standard can describe how much educational benefit is sufficient to
satisfy” the IDEA).
52
See Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 180, 182 (3rd Cir. 1986) (the
IDEA “calls for more than a trivial educational benefit” with an adequate IEP being one that provides
“significant learning,” and where a student displays considerable intellectual potential there must be “a
great deal more than a negligible” benefit provided).
53
Id. at 182, 184.
54
Id. at 184 (emphasis added) (citing Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982)).
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underlining the inadequacy of minimal benefits55 rather than the
non-necessity of maximal ones (which it still affirms).56 Thus, courts
applying the standard have tended to underscore that grade advancement
does not by itself signal adequate benefits.
Nevertheless, ambiguities similar to those facing the “some” standard
continue to haunt its “meaningful” alternative. These principally concern the
point at which benefits, while falling short of maximal, become significant
enough to count as “meaningful” as opposed to merely minimal or modest.
Additionally, while most courts applying the standard tend to agree on the
importance of explicitly factoring in a student’s potential,57 they have been
less forthcoming about how such potential should be factored in—and even
the need to do so is not always mandated.58
Finally, five circuits have at times used both the “some” and
“meaningful” benefit standards.59 In some circuits, courts tend to use the
standards interchangeably, or at least to go back and forth between them in

55
See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3rd Cir. 1999) (rejecting
any “bright-line rule” or “single standard” in favor of gauging adequacy of benefits “in relation to the
child’s potential”).
56
See Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 1999) (the “IDEA and case law interpreting
the statute do not require potential maximizing services. Instead the law requires only that the [plan] in
place be reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful benefit on the child”); Polk, 853 F.2d at 178–79
(“However desirable the goal of maximizing each child’s potential may be in terms of individuals, the
Court obviously recognized that achieving such a goal would be beyond the fiscal capacity of state and
local governments, and that Congress had realized that fact as well.”).
57
See Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Only by considering
an individual child’s capabilities and potentialities may a court determine whether an educational benefit
provided to that child allows for meaningful advancement.”); Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 247 (“When
students display considerable intellectual potential, IDEA requires ‘a great deal more than a negligible
[benefit].’” (quoting Polk, 853 F.2d at 182)).
58
See D.B. ex rel Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 36–37 (1st Cir. 2012) (Although “[i]n most
cases, an assessment of a child’s potential will be a useful tool for evaluating the adequacy of his or her
IEP[,] . . . there can still be an assessment of . . . a meaningful educational benefit” without it, so that “a
determination as to a child’s potential for learning and self-sufficiency does not have to precede a
determination that the child’s IEP complies with the IDEA”).
59
See Wenkart, supra note 42, at 2–3 (collecting sources establishing that “[f]our circuits, the
Second, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth circuits, have at times used both the ‘some educational benefit’ and
‘meaningful educational benefit’ standards”). The First Circuit seems recently to have joined this camp.
See Esposito, 675 F.3d at 34 (discussing both the “some educational benefit” and “meaningful benefit”
standards).
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60

different cases. In others, there seems to be a gradual drift toward the
“meaningful” approach.61
The amorphous language of both standards, and the ambiguities
confronting their respective proxy factors, have led some observers to doubt
whether any substantive, as opposed to merely terminological, difference
exists between them, especially given their common roots in Rowley.62
Moreover, that five circuits have shifted from one standard to the other may
be taken as a signal of further erosion of the distinction between them. 63
Others, however, continue to debate the competing merits of the standards,
on the premise that a significant difference between them remains.64
In principle, there does seem to be a substantive difference between the
two standards—over and above their differing labels—at least on a point of
emphasis. Although both standards reject the need for maximal benefits, as
well as the adequacy of merely trivial ones, it is the former that is leaned on
heavily by the “some” benefit standard (especially in cases of “severe”
60
This seems to be the case for the Fifth Circuit. See Klein Independent Sch. Dist. v. Hovem,
690 F.3d 390, 397 (5th Cir. 2012) (invoking both the “meaningful” and “some” educational benefit
standards). There are similar ambiguities in the Ninth and perhaps also First Circuit. See R.B., ex rel.
F.B. V. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Rowley to adopt the
“basic floor” language of “some” benefit); N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1209
(9th Cir. 2008) (adopting “meaningful” benefit language); J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938,
951 n.10 (9th Cir. 2010) (expressly stating that its use of the “meaningful” standard remains aligned with
the mainstream interpretation of Rowley); Esposito, 675 F.3d at 37–38 (ostensibly applying “meaningful”
standard in a First Circuit decision while also invoking “some” benefit language and cases).
61
This seems to be the case for the Second and Sixth circuits. See Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t,
692 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2012); Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 Fed. App’x 968, 974–75 (6th Cir.
2012) (adopting “meaningful” standard).
62
See Blake C. ex rel. Tina F. v. Dep’t of Educ., State of Haw., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1206 (D. Haw.
2009) (declaring, “various opinions have left it ambiguous as to what the precise difference, if any, is
between ‘meaningful’ benefit and ‘some’ benefit”); Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Evan Blewett,
When Good Is No Longer Good Enough: How the High Stakes Nature of the No Child Left Behind Act
Supplanted the Rowley Definition of a Free and Appropriate Public Education, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 5, 20–
21 (2012) (stating, “[i]t is unclear whether or not there is any real difference” between the standards or if
it is merely “semantics”); Wenkart, supra note 42, at 4, 29 (“[T]he use of different terminology does not
appear to create different substantive standards or lead to different results” and thus “there appears to be
very little substantive difference between the use of the two terms . . . .”).
63
Wenkart, supra note 42, at 3 (stating that “[t]he use of both terms in these circuits has further
clouded the distinction between ‘some educational benefit’ and ‘meaningful educational benefit’”).
64
Compare Lester Aron, Too Much or Not Enough: How Have the Circuit Courts Defined a Free
Appropriate Public Education After Rowley?, 39 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1, 25 (2005) (stating that the “some
educational benefit” is the appropriate standard), with Cali Cope-Kasten, Bidding (Fair)well to Due
Process: The Need for a Fairer Final Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution,
42 J.L. & EDUC. 501, 538 (2013) (stating that the “some benefit” standard is much too low a bar), and
Scott Goldschmidt, A New IDEA for Special-Education Law: Resolving the “Appropriate” Educational
Benefit Circuit Split and Ensuring a Meaningful Education for Students with Disabilities, 60 CATH. U.L.
REV. 749, 775 (2011) (arguing that “meaningful benefit” is the more appropriate and fair standard), and
Scott F. Johnson, Rowley Forever More? A Call for Clarity and Change, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 25, 25–26
(2012) (arguing that the some-benefit standard is “counter-intuitive and can create an adversarial
atmosphere between parents and schools that can lead to litigation”).
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disability),65 while its “meaningful” alternative takes pain to underscore the
latter (especially in cases of significant potential).66
Nevertheless, in practice neither standard provides much guidance.
Moreover, at times their application suggests a convergence, hovering
around a middle ground between “trivial” and “maximal” benefits.67 Indeed,
the overlap—and attendant uncertainties—can take a disconcerting form.
Thus, in one case, a court applying the “meaningful” standard upheld an IEP
as yielding “demonstrable academic . . . benefits” where a dyslexic student
showed average gains in most educational areas but only very modest ones
in the areas most directly affected by the condition (reading and writing).68
Yet in another case, an IEP enabling similar progress was held to be
inadequate under the lower “some” benefit standard.69
2. Post-Rowley Developments
Two sets of developments subsequent to the Rowley decision bear on its
continued authority in this area. First, at the state level, Rowley established
a federal floor, not a ceiling, for access to educational benefits for students
with disability. States are free to legislate more stringent requirements than
those of the IDEA if they wish.70 And while in practice the vast majority of
states have implemented language similar to the IDEA, “many deferring or

65
See Hall v. Vance Cty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir. 1985) (for “the most severely
handicapped” students, even “minimal” benefits may be adequate).
66
See Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182 (3rd. Cir. 1986) (where
a student displays considerable intellectual potential there must be “a great deal more than a negligible”
benefit provided).
67
Although even here one may wish to stake out a subtle, perhaps elusive, difference concerning
the desired middle ground, between “modest” versus “significant” benefits. Compare Lenn v. Portland
Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1086 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying the “some” benefit standard to state that the
IDEA sets “modest goals” in pursuit of “an appropriate rather than an ideal, education”), with Polk,
853 F.2d at 182 (applying the “meaningful” benefit standard to state that the IDEA calls for “significant
learning”), and D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 556 (3rd Cir. 2010) (“Although a state is
not required to supply an education to a handicapped child that maximizes the child’s potential, it must
confer an education providing ‘significant learning’ [. . . and . . .] ‘the provision of merely more than a
trivial educational benefit’ is insufficient.”).
68
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 343, 347, 349–350, 349–350 n.3
(5th Cir. 2000).
69
Hall, 774 F.2d at 630, 632, 636. See Johnson, supra note 48, at 566–67 (pointing to Houston and
Hall as instances where courts “produced varying results with similar information” regarding students’
educational improvements, and attributing the variance “to the fact that courts do not have a substantive
standard” to guide their assessment of “whether a gain of a certain amount is sufficient progress or not”).
70
See Town of Burlington v. Dep’t. of Educ. Com. of Mass., 736 F.2d 773, 792 (1st Cir. 1984)
(“Burlington II”), aff’d, 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (“[A] state is free to exceed, both substantively and
procedurally, the protection and services to be provided to its disabled children.”). States may also adopt
laxer standards if they forgo federal funding, but no state has. Tyce Palmaffy, The Evolution of the
Federal Role, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 6 (Chester E. Finn, Jr., et al.
eds., 2001).
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referring explicitly to the Act,” a few states have gone further. At one point
in time, Massachusetts had legislated a “maximum possible development”
standard.72 And courts in North Carolina have interpreted its legislative
mandate of “full educational opportunity” to require the “full potential”
standard rejected in Rowley.73
On top of legislative requirements, many state constitutions also contain
clauses relating to education. And numerous state courts have interpreted
these to require the affirmative provision of a certain level of “adequate
education” to all students, one going beyond a merely “minimal” amount.74
Two decisions in particular, having broad influence on other state courts,
merit special mention. In Pauley v. Kelly, the West Virginia Supreme Court
held that the state had an obligation to develop “every child to his or her
capacity” along eight dimensions, from literacy, math and creative arts, to
knowledge of government and “social ethics,” to “self-knowledge,” work
skills and recreational pursuits.75 And in Rose v. Council for
Better Education, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the state was
required to equip each student with “sufficient” capacity in each of seven
similar dimensions.76 Any such requirements are, under the IDEA,
incorporated into the conditions that an IEP must comply within that state.77
Second, at the federal level, since its initial passing the IDEA has
undergone a successive series of statutory amendments, the cumulative
71
Andrea Blau, The IDEIA and the Right to an “Appropriate” Education, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
1, 15 (2007).
72
See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71B, § 2 (West) (2017) (requiring public schools to “assure the
maximum possible development” of handicapped students, which was amended on January 1, 2002 to
conform to the federal standard of “free and appropriate public education”); Stock v. Mass. Hosp. Sch.,
467 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Mass. 1984); Roland v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 987 (1st Cir. 1990)
(Massachusetts has “elected to go considerably above the federal floor” by “defin[ing] an appropriate
education as one assuring the maximum possible development of the child” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
73
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-106.1 (providing that the goal of the State is “to provide full
educational opportunity to all children with disabilities”); Burke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Denton,
895 F.2d 973, 983 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that North Carolina requires that students with disability be
given the opportunity to realize their “full potential commensurate with the opportunity given other
children”).
74
Johnson, supra note 48, at 568–69.
75
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979); see also Lujan v. Colorado State
Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 n.23 (Colo. 1982); Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985).
76
See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (enumerating the
seven dimensions as: oral and written communication; knowledge of economic, social, and political
systems; understanding of government processes; self-knowledge; arts; academic or vocational training;
academic or vocational skills); see also Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1202 (Kan. 2014);
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec.
Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993).
77
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa)–(bb) (2016); Individualized Education Program (IEP),
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Oct. 4, 2006), https://idea.ed.gov/explore/view/p/,root,dynamic,
TopicalBrief,10,.html [https://perma.cc/4AEV-WMEZ].
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effect of which suggests an evolution in overall Congressional purpose
toward stronger, and more substantive, requirements—one that, according
to many observers, renders the Rowley “some benefit” standard outdated and
in need of an upgrade.78 Principal among these are amendments in 1997 that
expressed the importance of upholding “high expectations” for students with
disability, to ensure that “to the maximum extent possible” such students
“meet developmental goals and . . . the challenging expectations that have
been established for all children,” so to equip them “to lead productive and
independent adult lives.”79 In 2001, the No Child Left Behind Act required
schools to report on students’ “yearly progress” as part of “ensuring that all
children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a
high-quality education,” one that includes “reaching, at a minimum,
proficiency on challenging state academic achievement standards.”80 And in
2004 these were consolidated by amendments stipulating more stringent
standards for special-education teacher training, and for measuring,
evaluating, and reporting student progress.81
For many observers, then, the upshot of these federal developments is
twofold. First, to the extent that Rowley’s “basic floor of opportunity”
language had been interpreted in a largely procedural vein of simply making
“some” benefit formally available, these changes clearly signal a substantive
focus on actual outcomes, or effectively enabling real “progress.”82 A shift,
78
See Regina R. Umpstead, A Tale of Two Laws: Equal Educational Opportunity in Special
Education Policy in the Age of the No Child Left Behind Act and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 263 ED. L. REP. 1, 1 (Mar. 3, 2011) [hereinafter “Umpstead, A Tale of Two Laws”]
(stating, “each update has been more of a tinkering with the original blueprint of the laws in order to
advance [Congress’] broader goals”); Regina R. Umpstead, Special Education Assessment Policy Under
the No Child Behind Act and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 145, 149 (2009) (stating that Congress is in fact attempting to modify the IDEA and is “critical”
to policy making surrounding IDEA); Andrea Valentino, The Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act: Changing what Constitutes an “Appropriate” Education, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 139,
152–55 (2007) (arguing that the legislature is trying to adopt a new “appropriate education” substantive
standard, overturning the Court’s “some educational benefit” standard).
79
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A) (emphasis added). But cf. L.T. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80,
83 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument that these amendments change the Rowley standard to one
requiring “maximum benefit;” interpreting them instead as “simply articulat[ing] the importance of
teacher training, [not] as overruling Rowley”).
80
See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(b)(2), 6301 (2015) (requiring yearly reports).
81
See Valentino, supra note 78, at 158–60 (summarizing 2004 amendments).
82
See Philip T.K. Daniel and Jill Meinhardt, Valuing the Education of Students with Disabilities:
Has Government Legislation Caused a Reinterpretation of a Free Appropriate Public Education?,
222 ED. LAW REP. 515, 535 (stating that the standards-based approach of the statutory modifications
“shifts the focus from process to outcome and results”); Dixie Snow Huefner, Updating the FAPE
Standard Under IDEA, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 367, 377 (2008) (stating that the 1997 and 2004 statutory updates
to IDEA have an increased focus on “assessing academic progress” and have “clarified the expectations
for FAPE”); Umpstead, A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 78, at 1 (stating that the No Child Left Behind
Act was a “unique” shift indicating Congress’ focus on progress assessments); H.R. REP. 105-95 at
83–84 (May 13, 1997) (“This Committee believes that the critical issue now is to place greater emphasis
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that is, from “some benefit” to “some progress,” at the least. And perhaps
going further, a second shift to “meaningful progress.”83
The storm clouds, long gathering, have now burst. Last summer, the
Tenth Circuit declined the invitation to shift, in the face of mounting
criticism, from the “some” to the “meaningful” standard.84 The Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari in the case, to revisit the question and,
perhaps, its own answer in Rowley.85
We may summarize the existing legal landscape as follows. At the
federal level there exist competing standards of some benefit/progress versus
meaningful benefit/progress, with ongoing debate concerning the precise
meaning of each and the differences between them, with the Supreme Court
now re-entering the fray. Some states, meanwhile, have adopted more
stringent standards (typically, for all students, not just for those with
disability), which require the development of student potential up to
maximal or at least sufficient levels.
B. Rethinking Our Aim: from “Equality of Opportunity” to “Equity of
Access”
1. The Distributive Character of the Question
The Rowley “some benefit” standard has come in for voluminous
criticism, both on substantive grounds, for embodying too modest a
commitment and, more formally, for providing too little guidance as to what

on improving student performance and ensuring that children with disabilities receive a quality public
education.”); Philip T.K. Daniel, “Some Benefit” or “Maximum Benefit”: Does the No Child Left Behind
Act Render Greater Educational Entitlement to Students with Disabilities, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 347, 352–53
(2008) (explaining that 1997 and 2004 IDEA amendments, No Child Left Behind, and Federal
Regulations finalized in 2006 all put greater emphasis on the need for substantive progress). See generally
Perry A. Zirkel, Have the Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Razed Rowley
and Raised the Substantive Standard for “Free and Appropriate Public Education”?, 28 NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 397 (2008); Perry A. Zirkel, Is It Time for Elevating the Standard for FAPE Under
IDEA?, 79 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 497 (2013).
83
Reinforcing this is the view taken by some commentators that the federal circuit split heralds an
evolution toward the meaningful benefit standard. See David Ferster, Broken Promises: When Does a
School’s Failure to Implement an Individualized Education Program Deny a Disabled Student a Free
and Appropriate Public Education, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 71, 82 (2010) (stating that the circuit shift
illustrates the “evolving views of special education and the purpose of IDEA”); Amy J. Goetz et al.,
The Devolution of the Rowley Standard in the Eighth Circuit: Protecting the Right to a Free and
Appropriate Public Education by Advocating for Standards-Based IEPs, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 503, 514
(2011) (arguing that some circuits’ adoption of the “meaningful benefit” standard is evidence of a
substantive “evolution” from Rowley).
84
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1340
(10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
85
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). For discussion
of the Court’s recently delivered opinion, see the Afterword.
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should be taken to satisfy it.86 The alternative “meaningful benefit” standard,
while ostensibly signaling a more robust commitment, has proven similarly
difficult to apply. Indeed, the vagueness of each has led some to collapse
them together.87 For others, the standards retain a clear-enough difference,
but the ongoing conflict between them is its own cause for lament, increasing
uncertainty and producing horizontal inequity for similarly situated students
across different jurisdictions.88
Academic commentators have similarly struggled with the question,
many simply embracing one or the other side of the circuit split, but with
little guidance on how to make either standard more determinate, much less
principled.89 Others, despairing of any substantive resolution, have turned
their attention to improving procedural mechanisms.90

86
See Cope-Kasten, supra note 64, at 522–38 (commenting that the Rowley decision “sets a pretty
low bar” and that the courts “do not produce good outcomes for students because of the low standard set
by the Rowley decision”); Valentino, supra note 78, at 154–55 (arguing that the “some educational
benefit” standard is no longer viable); see also references cited in supra notes 78, 82–83 (arguing against
the Rowley “some benefit” standard).
87
See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
88
See Aron, supra note 64, at 6, 25 (noting the “definitional difference [which] has led to divergent
results for students in different parts of the country” and, further, to district courts and state hearing
officers “struggling with the existing circuit split”); Goldschmidt, supra note 64, at 752 (stating that a
clear definition is necessary to resolve the current issue of students receiving “different levels of
education depending on where they live in the United States”); Johnson, supra note 64, at 25 (arguing
the circuit split must be resolved because “application of these different standards has produced vastly
different results for students with disabilities”).
89
Compare Johnson, supra note 64, at 31 (advocating “meaningful” benefit as moving a child
toward self-sufficiency and thus a case-specific inquiry gauged in relation to a child’s potential), and
Goetz et al., supra note 83, at 514 (rejecting notion that what is an appropriate education can be reduced
to a single standard; instead, IEP must be reasonably calculated to enable a child to receive meaningful
educational benefits in light of her or his potential), with Gary L. Monserud, The Quest for a Meaningful
Mandate for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 675, 832
(2004) (interpreting meaningful to mean “effective results” and “demonstrable improvement” as a
working standard). See also references cited in supra note 61 (criticizing the lack of substance to the
standard).
90
See Perry A. Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education from Board of Education v. Rowley:
Razing the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 MD. L. REV. 466, 469–70 (1983) (“[T]he bewildering variation
among the handicapped . . . def[ies] a single substantive standard and require[s] instead experimentation,
variation, and evolution of a multifactor concept of appropriateness.”); Jon Romberg, The Means Justify
the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special Education Law, 48 HARV. J. LEGIS. 415, 466 (2011) (calling
for better “collaboration, individualization and contractualization” in IEPs); Anne E. Johnson, Note,
Evening the Playing Field: Tailoring the Allocation of the Burden of Proof at IDEA Due Process
Hearings to Balance Children’s Rights and Schools’ Needs, 46 B.C. L. REV. 591, 615–16 (2005);
Michele L. Beatty, Not a Bad IDEA: The Increasing Need to Clarify Free Appropriate Public Education
Provisions Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 46 SUFFOLK L. REV. 529 (2013)
(arguing that some interpretations of the FAPE, namely the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Doe ex rel. Doe
v. Todd county School District, 625 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 2010) violates procedural due process rights);
Cope-Kasten, supra note 64, at 502, 538 (arguing that “due process is not a fair mechanism for special
education dispute resolution”).
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Why has the issue of adequate benefits proved so intractable? The most
elemental difficulty is as easy to state as it is to overlook: it is simply unclear
what our guiding aim here is (or should be). Quite apart, that is, from the
fact that the language used in formulating the standards is vague, what is
also, and more importantly, left unclear is the underlying aspiration: by what
yardstick are we to assess when benefits suffice to be “some,” rather than
“too little” or “too much”? What is our goal? And, in pursuing it, what
competing concerns do we face? Similarly, for “meaningful”: what makes
benefits “meaningful” rather than merely “some,” and at what point do they
pass into the impermissibly “maximal”? Again, what are our underlying
criteria for meaningfulness, and what competing concerns, if any, do we face
in achieving it?
Ostensibly, our aim might be to secure “equality of opportunity” for
students with disability, a notion finding some support in the language of
both the statute and case law.91 But as we shall see momentarily, that norm
provides little guidance when our task is not to remove illegitimate barriers
to procedural fairness, but rather to adjudicate between similarly legitimate
claims in the affirmative provision of resources, for the sake of ensuring all
are fairly given effective access to a substantive benefit.
And therein lies the nub of the problem. The question posed by adequate
benefits is fundamentally a distributive one: What distribution of educational
resources will fairly provide students with disability effective access to
educational development, taking into account the similarly legitimate,
competing uses of such resources for the educational development of others?
Yet forthright recognition of the distributive character of the issue (i.e., of
the need to weigh the claims of students with disability on educational
resources against the similarly legitimate claims of other students) has been
conspicuously absent in the discussions of courts and commentators.92
Indeed, judicial evaluations of the adequacy of IEP benefits routinely
91

As reviewed infra Part I.B.2.
For an important exception, and criticism of the general lacuna in this regard, see MARK KELMAN
& GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE 6–9, 14–15, 199ff (1997). For one of few sources that mention
the distributive character of the issue, and even then only in passing, see Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Board
of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley: Utter Chaos, 12 J.L. & ED. 235
(1983) (“The obvious rationale for the [Rowley] Court’s blatant disregard of Congressional intent was its
unspoken fear that a contrary result would have opened the floodgates . . . [and] place[d] overwhelming
constraints on the states’ ability to provide educational services to all children . . . .”). Other observers
mentioning the issue of cost do so one-sidedly, focusing solely on the effectiveness of different programs
for students with disabilities, without regard to the distributive effects on other students. See Tara L. Eyer,
Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the Basic Floor of Opportunity for
Children with Disabilities, 126 EDUC. L. REP 1, 9 (1998) (focusing on the Supreme Court’s language that
“it would do no good for Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing access to public education
only to have the child receive no benefit from that education”). Finally, for a discussion of quite distinct
distributive issues in this context, see Daniela Caruso, Autism in the U.S.: Social Movement and Legal
Change, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 483, 519–21 (2010) (emphasizing cost barriers facing families of students
with disability in pursuing claims under the IDEA).
92
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proceed without so much as a mention of the social opportunity costs
involved in securing students with disability access to additional educational
benefits, in terms of the potential educational benefits for other students
from the same resources.93
Despite this official silence—indeed, partly because of it—the
distributive character of the issue clearly lies at the heart of the trouble facing
existing legal approaches. Concerns over costs are the omnipresent backdrop
against which Rowley and its progeny have struggled to articulate an
appropriate standard. They are most obviously present in decisions hewing
closely to the “some” benefits pole, underlying these courts’ reluctance to
stray too far from a purely procedural vein, and into the terrain of substantive
gains. But they can also be glimpsed in the emphasis placed by “meaningful”
courts on not cutting off benefits too quickly for students with high
potential—these being the students most apt to reap significant gains at
relatively low cost. Yet remaining unacknowledged, such cost concerns
inform courts’ decisions inchoately at best, with no explicit reflection on any
guiding principles to assist in their satisfactory resolution. Moreover, even
if they were to be made explicit, courts would remain ill equipped to address
such concerns so long as they continued to view them solely through the
prism of equality of opportunity.
2. Educational Opportunity: From Nondiscrimination to Equitable
Access
Equality of opportunity, framed against a backdrop of
nondiscrimination, has long been the predominant lens in coming to grips
with the IDEA.94 In one respect this is understandable. The IDEA may be
93
For a few of the overwhelming majority of judicial opinions evaluating the adequacy of IEP
benefits by focusing solely on the student with the disability, see J.L. v. Mercer Island School Dist.,
592 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2009) (analyzing, in isolation, whether failure to specify the minutes per
week of individualized education violated the student’s IEP); C.B. ex rel. BB v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1,
636 F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that the IEP revolves around the “individualized” educational
needs of handicapped child alone); Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F.3d 769, 773 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(setting out the responsibilities of IEP Teams for providing services to students with disabilities without
any mention of needing to attend to the opportunity costs involved); D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ.,
602 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the IEP is comprised of a student’s abilities, goals for
improvement, and services needed to meet these goals, taken in isolation).
94
See Umpstead, A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 78, at 4–5 (“Varying conceptions of equal
educational opportunity have driven the debate over the provision of educational services to
disadvantaged students since the common school movement.”); Valentino, supra note 78, at 157
(“[C]hildren with disabilities [should] be afforded the same opportunities” to learn as nondisabled
children); Daniel & Meinhardt, supra note 82, at 515, 521–22, 524 (analyzing various interpretations of
FAPE standards against the “equal opportunity” language of the state constitutions); Goldschmidt, supra
note 64, at 774 (concluding that IDEA amendments were Congress’ attempt to ensure “equal educational
opportunity designed to realize [students’] full academic potential”); Eyer, supra note 92, at 5–6 (tracing
the role of “equal educational opportunity” pre-Rowley, to the Rowley interpretation, to more recent
IDEA amendments).
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seen as part and parcel of a more general scheme of federal disability
antidiscrimination law, alongside the 1973 Rehabilitation Act (RA)95 and its
1990 successor The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)96—a scheme
widely understood to extend to disability the reach of traditional civil-rights
concerns with combating invidious discrimination.97 Yet, ultimately, the
lenses of nondiscrimination and equality of opportunity are of limited help
in the IDEA context—and need supplementing by an analysis of distributive
equity.98
The central question posed by the issue of adequate benefits is simply
not well handled by the standard tools of antidiscrimination law. Aiming
principally to secure similar treatment for similarly situated individuals,
these tools focus primarily on rooting out illegitimate considerations
marring procedural fairness. But at issue in the IDEA context is precisely
that students with disability are not similarly situated, so that formally equal
treatment—by way of the standard educational plan—fails to accord them
substantively fair treatment. What is needed, rather, is differential treatment,
tailored to such students’ special needs, in the form of individualized
educational plans. Moreover, in determining the adequacy of such plans, our
principal task is neither: (a) to filter out the (perhaps hidden) role of
illegitimate considerations—such as illicit beliefs or attitudes concerning
those with disability;99 nor (b) simply to adjust procedural requirements to
95

29 U.S.C. § 701 (2013).
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2013).
97
See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277 (1987) (stating that from the
language of the statute, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was evidently patterned after Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to “address[] the broader problem of discrimination against the
handicapped”); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 801 (1999) (characterizing the
ADA as “seek[ing] to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against disabled individuals in order . . . to
guarantee those individuals equal opportunity”); see also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with
Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 413, 415 (1991) (describing ADA as “a second-generation civil rights statute that goes
beyond the ‘naked framework’ of earlier statutes and adds much flesh and refinement to traditional
nondiscrimination law”); Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights,
58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1207 (2007) (explaining that “American disability rights proponents . . . pursued
an antidiscrimination approach modeled after previous civil rights statutes, most notably Title VII” of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
98
Readers already convinced that the distributive character of the problem elucidated in the
previous section—namely, the need to prioritize among similarly legitimate claims to resources so as to
fairly provide effective access to the good of educational development—requires for its satisfactory
resolution an analysis sounding in distributive equity, rather than nondiscrimination or equality of
opportunity, may wish to proceed directly to Part I.B.3. For important earlier treatments of the
distributive character of the questions raised by disability accommodation, now in the ADA rather than
IDEA context, see Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 227, 230–31 (2000)
(discussing employment accommodation as a distributive question); David A. Weisbach, Toward a New
Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL. REV. F. 47, 47–50 (2009) (applying welfarist theories
of distributive justice to the issue of disability accommodation).
99
See infra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing “discriminatory disparate impact”
analysis).
96
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the special circumstances of “otherwise qualified” individuals with
disability.100 Rather, it is to weigh, in the provision of resources, the meeting
of their special needs against the similarly legitimate claims of other students
for the express purpose of securing for all access to a substantive benefit,
namely educational development. Traditional antidiscrimination analysis is
bereft of satisfactory criteria to guide us in this respect.101
This might be thought to overlook the “disparate impact” branch of
antidiscrimination law, with its focus on impermissible effects rather than
illegitimate processes.102 But analysis of “discriminatory disparate impact,”
as it has developed under the RA and ADA, sheds little added light here.
The central question in such cases is whether, despite there being no facial
discrimination—so that neutral rules have been applied even-handedly—the
effects of such formally equal treatment on those with disability are
nevertheless uneven, and, more to the point, uneven in a way that is
impermissible, so as to merit redress.103 And in answering this question we
face a fork in the road: (a) shall we continue to look to “discrimination” as
our lodestar, so that uneven effects are only impermissibly so when they
likely reflect some illegitimate consideration, one perhaps slipping past the
filter of facial discrimination analysis, and thus become permissible when a
legitimate or “rational” basis for them can be adduced?;104 or (b) should we
reach beyond such analysis and deem some uneven effects impermissible
even when they are not “discriminatory” (i.e., when they can be traced
entirely to legitimate considerations), if in the pursuit of such legitimate
100
See infra note 98 and 106 and accompanying text (discussing “reasonable accommodation” in
employment contexts under ADA).
101
At best, the procedural focus of such an analysis will tend to issue in the following limited
prescriptions: (a) counseling only that tailoring which can be fashioned within the expenditure of
formally equal resources per student, so as to adapt some pedagogic techniques to special needs, but
without provision for any supplementary learning aids requiring extra expenditures; or (b) mandating
only those extra expenditures that can be vindicated on “rational” criteria of educational merit (see infra
note 104 and accompanying text)—meaning where students with disability stand to reap greater marginal
improvements in their educational performance than would other students from the same further
resources. Neither of these has been taken as adequate by the courts, and for good reason: neither one
satisfies the IDEA’s legislative mandate, as discussed infra notes 113–115 and accompanying text, or
principled requirements of equitable access, as discussed infra Part II, and especially Part II.B.3.
102
Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate: ‘Meaningful Access’
to Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447 (2008) (arguing that courts have
identified two types of discrimination claims for purposes of relief under the RA and ADA:
(1) discriminatory intent and (2) discriminatory disparate impact).
103
Cf. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 290 (1985) (noting that not “all action disparately
affecting the handicap” is “unjustifiable”).
104
See, e.g., EEOC, Interim Enforcement Guidance on the Application of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 to Disability-Based Distinctions in Employer Provided Health Insurance (1993)
(holding that disability-based distinctions are allowed as non-discriminatory if a sound “actuarial”
rationale may be adduced for them); Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558–59
(7th Cir. 1999) (applying EEOC’s “actuarial rationale” test to evaluate insurance company’s disabilitybased distinction).
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interests there was nevertheless a failure to factor in the special
circumstances of those with disability? And if we wish to so broaden our
concern beyond “discriminatory” to simply “inequitable” disparate impact,
what are the relevant considerations of equity to guide our analysis?
Here, however, the case law has stalled in analogous fashion to IDEA
jurisprudence. Although courts have signaled a willingness to go beyond
traditional “discriminatory” analysis—so that simply failing to take into
account the uneven effects of a program or policy on those with disability
may qualify for a disparate-impact claim105—they have not provided much
guidance regarding when such uneven effects suffice or fall short for making
out a successful claim. Guidance, in other words, on what it would mean to
attend equitably to the special circumstances of those with disability. Rather,
in language strikingly resonant of the “some” and “meaningful” standards
of IDEA jurisprudence, they have fallen back on broadly phrased standards
of providing (some) “reasonable accommodation” within “manageable
bounds,” or ensuring “meaningful access” short of making “substantial” or
“fundamental” modifications to programs and policies.106 And so we circle
back to the same problems facing IDEA case law: standards not only vague
in their linguistic phrasing but, more troubling, unmoored in any underlying
aim to orient the analysis, and lacking, even, a crisp sense of relevant
considerations.107
To answer what it might mean to attend equitably to the special
circumstances of those with disability, we need to bear clearly in mind two
pointers: what is our purpose in a given context and how, in respect of that
purpose, are persons with disability differentially situated? Only then can we
know what sort of tailored treatment might be merited. In the IDEA setting,
our purpose, again, is to secure access to a substantive benefit, the good of
educational development. Students with disability are differentially situated
in respect of that purpose because they face, in the language of distributive
105

See Choate, 469 U.S. at 295–99 (redressing discrimination resulting from “thoughtlessness and
indifference” as opposed to discriminatory animus or intent); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44,
52 (2003) (distinguishing disparate impact and disparate treatment claims).
106
Choate, 469 U.S. at 299–301; see id. at 299 (determining “which disparate impacts § 504 [of the
Rehabilitation Act] might make actionable” requires an inquiry into the balancing of “countervailing
considerations” of ensuring access while staying “within manageable bounds”); see also id. at 301
(“[A] benefit cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped
individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled; to assure meaningful access, reasonable
accommodations in the grantee’s program or benefit may have to be made.”). Subsequently, of course,
this language has been codified in numerous statutory requirements—not only under the ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§§12112(b)(5)(A), 12181–12183 (2012), but also laws such as the Fair Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. §3604—that are applicable to a range of public and private entities, including providers of
“public accommodations” as well as universities and employers who need, when fashioning their
eligibility requirements, to make “reasonable accommodation” short of “undue hardship” for “otherwise
qualified” individuals with disability.
107
A sense, that is, of concretely what sorts of factors or concerns are or are not germane to
“manageability” of accommodation, “substantiality” of modifications, etc.
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justice, a “conversion deficit”: a deficit in translating a given bundle of
means (educational resources) into valued ends (educational
development).108 And, so, formal equality of resources fails to secure them
substantively fair treatment—treatment that is fair in terms of its
effects—because it fails to take into account their differential capacity for
converting such resources into educational benefit. And in deciding how to
tailor treatment to their differential needs, there is no plausible alternative to
addressing it head on as a question of distributive equity; as a question, that
is, of prioritizing among similarly legitimate claims to resources—i.e., the
special needs of students with disability and the needs of other
students—for the sake of fairly providing to all effective access to
educational development.109
Strong support for this view of educational accommodation, as requiring
substantive equity beyond procedural equality of opportunity, is found in the
language of the IDEA itself. In contrast to the RA110 and ADA,111 the IDEA
conspicuously avoids any mention of “discrimination.”112 The Act speaks
instead of “the right” of persons with disability “to participate in or
contribute to society.”113 It then underscores that those with disability have,
however, “unique needs,” which must be “appropriately” met if they are to
108

See SEN, supra note 6, at 28–29, 33–34 (discussing how disabilities can affect the ability to
convert resources into results).
109
Some might contend that, even accepting its resource-intensive character, nevertheless such
tailoring should be seen in terms not “merely” of distributive justice between similarly legitimate claims,
but, rather, of a more imperative form of corrective justice—to “right the wrongs” of the invidious
discrimination involved in configuring the built and social-institutional environment in ways that
disadvantage the disabled. Such an argument would draw on the important insights, discussed below, of
the “social model” literature on disability, concerning the ways in which departures from the statistical
mean that we commonly associate with disabilities are not necessarily “disadvantages” but only become
so in light of the way in which individuals having them interact with their specific architectural and
institutional environments. See infra notes 206–208 and accompanying text (discussing the social
model’s conceptions of impairment and disability). However, even accepting the strongest social
constructivist view of the disadvantages from disability (and, hence, of the sources of the “conversion
deficit” at issue here), we would still need normative guidance concerning what social configuration of
architectural and institutional arrangements would be just, either in the past or today. See Weisbach,
supra note 98, at 48–49 (discussing how the social model’s causal claims do not settle the normative
question). And even if we wished to approach that question through the lens of corrective justice, as a
matter of “redressing the wrongs” involved in a discriminatory configuration, to answer what would
“make things right” or undo the discrimination would ultimately involve some baseline inquiry into what
would have been the right thing to do in the first place and thus how far an unjust deviation took place
(whether measured in terms of “impermissible harm” to those with disability or “unjust enrichment” to
those without). And in settling that question, we would have to turn our mind to a normative evaluation
of the tradeoffs facing decision makers back then, in terms of the social opportunity costs involved in the
various alternative courses of action. We would have to, that is, turn again to a distributive-justice
framework, only now pushed back in time.
110
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
111
42 U.S.C. § 12101–12182 (2012).
112
20 U.S.C. § 1400–1482 (2012).
113
Id. at § 1400(c)(1) (2012).
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be effectively enabled to so participate and contribute. In the specific
context of educational needs, its aim is to ensure access to “improve[d]
educational results” seen as an intrinsically valuable, indeed constitutive
good, for the development of personhood and citizenship.115
Why, then, have courts and commentators—and indeed the IDEA itself
to some extent116—continued to speak in terms of “equality of opportunity”
as the guiding ideal, with its procedural overtones and roots in
nondiscrimination? Part of the answer lies, no doubt, in the pull of equality
of opportunity as a bulwark against a slide into an undesirable “equality of
outcome.” However, substantive equity aims at a target distinct from both
procedural fairness and substantive equality.
Equity of access is neither equality of opportunity nor equality of
outcome, departing from both in two ways. First, as opposed to opportunity
or outcome, its focus is on access to outcomes. Second, as opposed to
equality of access, it aims to achieve equity or fairness in access.
Regarding the first, access goes, on the one hand, beyond the focus of
opportunity on redressing procedural defects for the sake of ensuring that
competitive processes are fair—be it through the removal of illegitimate
barriers to ensure formal equality or, even, the tailoring of otherwise
legitimate procedural requirements to those differently situated, to ensure
truly fair equality of opportunity. Access, by contrast, has its eye trained
directly on a substantive good, seen as valuable in itself.117 On this view, our
aim in the IDEA context of formative K–12 education is not only to “level
the playing field” so as to ensure a truly “fair process” of competition for
grades, but also to secure each student “fair access” to the good of
educational development, seen as intrinsically valuable. And to ensure that
such access is effective rather than merely formal, we need to attend to
involuntary differences in individual needs and capacities. At the same time,
and from the other direction, access stops short of a direct focus on

114

Id. at § 1400(d)(1)(A).
Id. at § 1400(d)(3) (emphasis added).
116
Id. at § 1400(c)(1). It should be noted that, on the other hand, the Act also makes reference to
the goal of enabling “self-sufficiency,” which, as discussed below at Part II.A.3, is best understood as a
principle of distributive equity, albeit one facing considerable difficulties. It is also a standard that courts
have shied away from adopting as a yardstick for the adequacy of benefits. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
117
That is, our aim in the IDEA setting is both to move beyond formal equality, by tailoring
treatment for differentially-situated persons, and to do so for a substantive purpose, of directly enabling
access to a good, namely educational development. By contrast, one might seek to move beyond formal
equality, and tailor treatment for those differently situated, but do so while still retaining a purely
procedural aim, such as, say, ensuring truly “fair competition” for jobs by reasonably accommodating to
the special circumstances of “otherwise qualified” individuals, as may be thought to be the case in
employment settings under the ADA. Although, for the view that even in such settings, accommodation
requires attending to “distributive considerations,” see Jolls, supra note 98, at 251.
115
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outcomes, sharing opportunity’s sensitivity to leaving a role for individual
choice and responsibility in determining end results.118
Second, in the place of equality—whether of a procedural or substantive
kind—we aspire to equity or fairness. Our aim, to recall, is to correct for the
insensitivity of formal equality of resources to the conversion deficit facing
students with disability, so as to ensure them substantively fair access to
educational development. But does equitably adapting resource provision to
their conversion deficit mean aiming to eliminate all disparities in access to
development—so as to prescribe equalized access to outcomes? Not
necessarily. Whether fair access requires, as a matter of distributive justice,
equalized access is a key point of contention taken up below. For now, it
suffices to say that our orienting focus is not on eliminating all disparities in
access but rather on redressing unjustified or inequitable disparities. Leaving
open for the moment how disparities may be justified or impugned on
grounds of distributive equity, here we simply observe that equitable access
may, but need not, issue in equalized access.
Equity of access, so conceived, is strongly consonant with the Supreme
Court’s own hesitations in Rowley concerning the aptness of “equality”
thinking in this context. Taking merely formal or nondiscriminatory equality
of opportunity as insufficient, and substantive equality of outcome as too
demanding, the Court observed that the IDEA’s aspiration may simply be
“too complex to be captured by the word ‘equal.’”119 Quite so. Lacking,
however, any conceptual alternative, the Court settled upon the
unsatisfactory “some benefit” standard, as an ad-hoc—unmoored and
vaguely specified—“midway” between procedural and substantive
equality.120 But we now have to hand precisely the alternative conceptual
frame needed—one that requires not only departing from equality, but also
moving past opportunity versus outcome. Equity of access sites us in the
right frame: an analysis of distributive priority that reaches beyond all
procedural concerns to focus directly on effective access to substantive
benefits, while jettisoning any commitment to equalizing, aiming instead to
secure fair access to all.

118

As elaborated below, infra notes 137 and 212–214 and accompanying text.
See Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 198–99 (1982) (“[F]urnishing handicapped children with only such
services as are available to non-handicapped children would in all probability fall short of the statutory
requirement of ‘free appropriate public education;’ to require, on the other hand, the furnishing of every
special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s potential is, we think, further than
Congress intended to go. Thus to speak in terms of ‘equal’ services in one instance give less than what
is required by the Act and in another instance more. The theme of the Act is ‘free appropriate public
education,’ a phrase which is too complex to be captured by the word ‘equal’ whether one is speaking of
opportunities or services.”).
120
Id. at 195, 198, 200.
119
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3. Distributive Equity within Educational Opportunity
Equitable access in this sense also fits squarely within a distinct meaning
of “opportunity” in education, over and above one that simply signals
procedural fairness or a desire to steer clear of equality of outcome. In this
distinct sense, “opportunity” may be taken to indicate a more
important—higher order or simply more urgent—normative commitment
than that of general distributive justice. On this view, opportunity points to
a domain of special goods—such as K–12 education (health is commonly
thought to be another)—that are taken to be more important than other, more
generic goods subject “merely” to general distributive justice. Why?
Because such special goods are thought either to meet especially urgent
needs or to serve as enabling preconditions for attaining most other goods,
and as such to be requisites for persons to form a sense of self and take an
active part in society as citizens and participants in the economy. 121
Consequently, straight tradeoffs between these special goods and other
generic goods are to be curbed.
Within, however, any one domain of such special goods, questions of a
distributive character will still arise—due, among other reasons, to the
challenges posed by disability. And to tackle these will still require recourse
to principles of distributive priority, even if these are now cabined in their
application, serving to evaluate across competing claims only as they arise
within a delimited domain. Thus, rather than a rejection of distributive
equity, what issues from this view of “opportunity goods” is instead a
restriction on its scope: tradeoffs in the provision of resources for enabling
access to such special goods should take place internally, between the goods
themselves, rather than externally, against “outside” goods.
Support for such a restriction may also be found in a view based on
somewhat distinct premises, but having similar implications here. Some
theorists see goods such as health and education as “incommensurable” with,
even if not necessarily normatively prior to, other goods. On this view
education and health—and perhaps other goods as well—go to
fundamentally distinct components of the good life, each having an
“irreducible” value—one not sensibly compared to, or directly traded off
against, others.122 Consequently, distributive principles should only operate
121
For such a view concerning education, see Christopher Jencks, Whom Must We Treat Equally
for Educational Opportunity to be Equal, 98 ETHICS 518 (1988). Regarding health, see
NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 29–63 (2007). For the theoretical
foundations of both views, see John Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, 88 Q. J. ECON. 633, 641–
43 (1974); RAWLS, supra note 9, at 37–38 n.23 and accompanying text, 263–67, 475–76.
122
See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 95–103 (1983) (advancing a pluralist,
“sphere-specific” conception of distributive principles on communitarian grounds, as the best
interpretation of our historical practices); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2002) (advancing a substantive view of human flourishing, as relevant to
questions of justice, consisting of ten, irreducibly distinct, “spaces” of valuable states of being and doing).
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to prioritize or make tradeoffs within, but not across, such distinct
domains.123
The upshot of these views, for present purposes, is to restrict the focus
of our distributive analysis to the provision of educational resources for the
sake of enabling equitable access to the good of educational development.
Our analysis will not, in other words, be one of distributive justice writ
large—looking to ameliorate various kinds of disadvantage, using various
means of amelioration, lying inside and outside the sphere of education.
Rather, it will be an analysis of distributive equity cabined to the domain of
educational opportunity—aiming to redress disparities in educational
advantage through the expenditure of educational resources.124
Two more prudential considerations reinforce the case for so cabining
our analysis. First, doing so hews closely to the IDEA’s stated ambit, which
is precisely circumscribed to addressing educational disadvantages
associated with disability, through the expenditure of educational
resources.125 The Act targets, that is, only a subset of disabilities—namely,
“learning disabilities,” those that “adversely affect educational
performance”—and it uses circumscribed means to ameliorate
these— namely, the provision of the “special education and related services”
of an IEP.126 Closely following on from this is a second consideration:
practical limitations on the capacities of those charged with implementing
the IDEA, even if its statutory mandate were amenable to a more expansive
interpretation. As we will see next, the information and resources lying at
the disposal of those responsible for making priority decisions in real-world
settings—i.e., local educational authorities (in consultation with parents)
and the courts reviewing them—are largely restricted to the evaluation and

For further discussion and references on “incommensurability,” see infra notes 237–242 and
accompanying text.
123
Allocation decisions across spheres or spaces would need to be made in some other fashion, such
as, perhaps, through rough political judgments concerning adequate global budgets.
124
It bears clarifying that so cabining our analysis of distributive equity to the domain of education
does not entail downgrading the significance of distributive justice writ large. In particular, it is important
to keep in mind that even after the full realization of distributive equity internal to specific domains like
education and health, there likely will remain a strong case for pursuing “general” distributive justice in
order to redress residual or overall forms of involuntary disadvantage. For further discussion, see infra
at notes 230, 247.
125
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1) (2016).
126
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1) (2016). As we will see below in Part III,
both the questions of how to measure and evaluate “educational performance” and of when a disability
may be said to “adversely affect” such performance so as to render it eligible for an IEP, have generated
great controversy among courts and commentators. And as we will also see there, that controversy is
most clearly illuminated and resolved using the tools of distributive-justice theory; in particular, analysis
of the proper index of advantage for distributive concern.
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improvement of educational performance through provision of educational
resources.127
II. JUSTICE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES
A. Existing Standards Recast as Distributive Principles
What, then, is a fair distribution of educational resources—one that
provides students with disability equitable access to the good of educational
development, attending simultaneously both to their special needs and to the
similarly legitimate claims of other students?128 We begin by evaluating, as
candidate answers, the most prominent existing or proposed legal standards,
now reconstructed as distributive principles.
To ground our discussion, consider the following composite drawn from
the case law.129 Jamie is a third-grade student with severe dyslexia that
significantly impairs his reading and writing ability. He otherwise operates
at a high level of intellectual ability, scoring above average on the
standardized IQ tests commonly used to measure such ability. At the time
of the initial evaluation of his disability, Jamie’s test scores in different skills
and knowledge areas were as follows (the numbers indicate the grade level
he is performing at): 3.3 for math, 3.1 for general information, 0.8 for
reading and 1.2 for written language. That is, despite being slightly above
his own grade-three level for math and general information, he is below the
grade-one level for reading and just above it for writing.
Suppose our options for devising an appropriate IEP are the following:
(a) supplementing his regular classroom time with remedial small group
instruction; (b) further adapting his learning materials and tests into
multisensory format; (c) taking the multisensory modifications to the next
level with a specialized Alphabetic Phonics (AP) program that involves
more interaction with a specialized AP teacher (that a school may have to
train or bring in from the outside); and (d) finally, shifting him to a full-time
or majority-time alternative placement outside the regular classroom, where
127
This is not to say that more centralized administrative decisions could not play a larger role in
implementing IDEA commitments. See infra note 133. But even for those decision-makers, the
information and resources at their disposal will plausibly remain tied to the improvement of educational
outcomes through educational resources.
128
This way of posing the question limits consideration of available resources to those lying within
the domain of education, and it also limits consideration of the possible uses of educational resources to
the purpose of improving student access to educational development as the relevant metric of the good
(or index of advantage) for purposes of distributive concern. The reasons for so cabining tradeoffs are
given immediately above, in Part I.B.3. Refinements to “overall educational development” as our index
of advantage are considered below, in Part III.C.
129
D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 2010); C.B. ex rel. B.B. v. Special
Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis Minn., 636 F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2011); Hall v. Vance City Bd. of Educ.,
774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247
(3d Cir. 1999); Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Joyce, 200 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir. 2000).
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he would receive a slower, more methodical and highly structured approach
to learning as his normal course of instruction.
Naturally, within each option there exists a range of variation—there can
be more or less supplemental instruction, adaptation of materials, exposure
to AP, or even time spent in an alternative instructional environment.
Nevertheless, the basic point is clear enough: each successive option along
the spectrum involves a more extensive use of educational resources, while
also holding out the promise of greater educational progress for Jamie; at
least in terms of reading and writing, but also perhaps more generally if, as
may often be the case, improvements in one area catalyze those in others.130
Suppose further that Table 1 contains reasonable estimates of the extent
of annual progress held out by each option in its standard guise. Such figures
may be available before we decide on which IEP to adopt, as estimates of
the benefits different plans are “reasonably calculated” to hold out. Or they
may only emerge after the fact, as different IEPs are tried out in the search
for determining which is adequate.131 Naturally, the specific numbers given
here are simplifications, offered for illustrative purposes only. But similar
figures are typically used by both schools and courts in assessing the
adequacy of IEPs, and these particular ones are drawn from the case law.132

130

Such spillovers can take a more straightforward form, whereby, for instance, enhanced reading
ability directly improves learning in other areas (such as “general information”). Or they may operate
more diffusely, such as by increasing Jamie’s overall confidence and enthusiasm for learning and
participating in school-related activities more generally. Cf. Hall, 774 F.2d at 630–33 (describing how a
lack of progress in reading ability resulted in a student with dyslexia “develop[ing] significant emotional
difficulties because of his failures,” including a “‘school phobia’ characterized by frequent absences”
and a general “restricting [of] his activities”).
131
IEPs are often retrospectively deemed appropriate and eligible for public reimbursement, even
when the parents have sought out the plan on their own initiative. See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t
of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (holding that a federal court’s authority to grant “appropriate” relief
under IDEA §1415(i)(2)(C)(ii) includes “the power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for
their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such
placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act”); Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A,
557 U.S. 230, 244 n.11 (2009) (clarifying that Burlington applies to extend IDEA statutory authority to
“hearing officers as well as courts to award reimbursement notwithstanding the provision’s silence with
regard to hearing officers”).
132
See supra note 129 (citing cases used to form a composite on which the discussion is based).
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Table 1: Annual Progress Under Different Plans

Reading
&
Writing
All
Other
Areas

Initial
Level
1.0

No IEP

Plan A

Plan B

Plan C

Plan D

0

0.2

0.4

0.8

1.0

3.2

0.8

1.0

1.0

1.1

1.1

Thus, it is supposed that Jamie would make no progress in reading and
writing without an individualized program, while the extent of his progress
with a program depends significantly on the specific IEP chosen. Plan C, for
instance, enables twice the progress of Plan B, but still falls short of enabling
an improvement of a full grade level per year. For that, we would need
Plan D, which enables Jamie to make roughly average annual
progress—remaining at a lower overall capacity compared to others, but
perhaps not widening the gap. In all other learning areas, it is supposed that
Jamie would still need at least a minimal individualized program to make
average annual progress.
Which plan—or modification or combination of them—is or ought to be
required under the IDEA?133 A number of alternative answers to this
question have been advanced over the years. Some of these may be seen as
simply specifying with greater precision the “some” or “meaningful”
standards, in order to provide more determinate guidance. Others may be
seen more plausibly as substitute standards. The main candidates contend
that an IEP should enable students with disabilities to realize one of the
following: (a) “equal results” with other students; (b) their “maximum
potential”; (c) a “minimal level” of achievement; (d) the “same progress” as
other students; or (e) “efficient progress.” We take up each of these in turn,
evaluating their appeal and drawbacks. In the course of doing so, we will
133
Posing the question this way may seem to imply an institutional preference for case-specific
implementation of IDEA commitments—by contrast, say, to more administratively coordinated
approaches such as centralized school finance decisions that compare and evaluate commitments across
categories of disabilities or students. However, nothing in what follows should be taken to commit to one
or another view of the best mode of institutionally implementing IDEA commitments. Rather, it is
engaged in the somewhat prior task of exploring, at the level of normative first principle, what those
commitments should be—by way of a systematic analysis both of candidate principles of distributive
equity and of candidate indices of educational advantage to which such principles should apply. It is for
the sake of grounding that theoretical discussion that we consider here a specific case of the sort routinely
faced by local educational authorities and the courts. This leaves open, for future work, the equally
significant task of exploring, at the level of institutional design, how best to implement our normative
commitments in this area. I thank Jasmine Harris and Aaron Tang for helpful discussion of this issue.
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also begin to develop an alternative, the principle of “proportionate
progress,” which we will then consider more fully in the Section following.
1. Equalized Access: Telic Equality
On a first view, the appropriate aim for an IEP is to equalize educational
results for students with and without disabilities.134 This was the aspiration
attributed, by the Supreme Court in Rowley, to the district court’s standard
of providing students with disabilities a “full opportunity” to develop their
abilities. The higher Court interpreted (and rejected) this as a call for
achieving “strict” or “absolute” equality in outcomes.135
Equality of outcome is, of course, a notoriously unpopular ideal.136 We
should, however, take care to distinguish between several different
difficulties it faces. To the extent that it is taken simply to mandate
equalizing results across students, with great precision and irrespective of
students’ own efforts and cooperation, it is of course a plainly unattainable
and unattractive ideal. But few if any intend it that way. Virtually all
prominent views within distributive justice theory give some role to
individual responsibility, and thereby focus on securing individuals effective
access to the means for responsibly attaining outcomes, rather than on
realizing the end outcomes themselves.137 Moreover, a moment’s reflection
reveals that our focus should be on access to outcomes that are “reasonably
calculated” to occur, allowing for various imperfections in measurement.
Thus, a refined statement of the ideal would be to provide students with
disability educational benefits that are “reasonably calculated” to give them
“equalized access to outcomes.”
Even so refined, however, the ideal remains unattractive and it is
important to see that this is so for three distinct reasons. First, the aspiration
134

See Nicholas C. Burbules & Brian T. Lord, Equity, Equal Opportunity and Education,
4 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 169, 182 (1982) (“[I]t is easy to see why this interpretation is
appealing. First, its goal is the full equality of outcomes . . . in the case of education, such a view would
be especially appealing because we value so highly the attainment of education.”); Umpstead, A Tale of
Two Laws, supra note 78, at 6–7.
135
Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 198–99 (1982).
136
Indeed, its unpopularity is likely what pushes many away from distributive justice altogether,
and back into equality of opportunity as an alluring “midway” between formal equality and equality of
outcome. That reaction, however, fails to register two key points made in Part I.B, supra, namely: (a) that
distributive justice views also focus on a midway between formal equality and equality of outcome,
namely “equitable access” to effective means; and (b) to the extent that equality of opportunity is
understood, in the present context, as a distinct norm from that of distributive justice (as opposed to being
a vaguely specified distributive aspiration itself), it provides limited guidance here given the distributive
character of the question posed.
137
E.g., Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185
(1981); Amartya Sen, Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 J. PHIL. 4, 169
(1985); Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77 (1989);
G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989). This point is elaborated
below, with added references, infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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seems unattainable, at least in many instances of significant or severe
disability. This is likely so even in the case of Jamie, of a single impairment
directly affecting a single learning area for an otherwise slightly
above-average student.138 And it holds true even more strongly for the many
cases that involve much more severe, and often multiple, impairments with
impacts on a wider range of learning areas.
However, the unattainability of the aspiration is only apparent, and
seeing why reveals the deeper flaws with the ideal. If we wished truly to
provide access to equal results, we could “level down”: i.e., once the ceiling
of improvements for students with disabilities has been hit, so that additional
educational resources would confer upon them no benefit, we could
nevertheless continue with the program of equalization by reducing the
educational resources devoted to those without disability, until their levels
had sufficiently dropped. That is, we could reduce the level of the better off
even when doing so does nothing to improve the level of the worse off, but
does bring the two closer, simply for the sake of equalizing.139
Now, of course most proponents of an equalized-access view would stop
short of counseling such leveling down, and insist that their commitment to
equality is not unqualified or absolute, so that all things considered the harm
of reducing benefits for some without corresponding gains for others may
not be worth the increase in equality. What is important to notice, however,
is that even where leveling down is rejected in practice, it remains in
principle a matter of regret for this view that unequal access to outcomes
ensues (even if that regret is not a sufficient reason for action).140 On an
alternative view, however, the inequality in access is not, even in principle,
a matter of regret. While it is regretful that some students are not able to
achieve a higher level, it is not regretful that other students are able to do so.
This then points to the deepest flaw with the equalized-access view,
namely its “telic equality” notion that distributive equality is in itself a goal,
something valuable for its own sake.141 What is wrong with that view is that
138

Thus, after three years of education under Plan D, Jamie would still, in grade six, reach just a
fourth-grade level of reading. Presumably, additional supplements to Plan D could accelerate his progress
even further, but even so, it is unclear whether any amount of additional benefit would bring him to the
level of the most advanced readers in his class.
139
See DEREK PARFIT, EQUALITY OR PRIORITY? LINDLEY LECTURE 17–18, 23 (1991) (advancing
the “Levelling Down Objection” to equalizing).
140
See, e.g., ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 100 (1991) (asserting that although “it would
obviously be wrong to pursue equality by injuring those who are better endowed” and thus “[p]erfect
equality of resources [where “resources” include personal “physical or mental powers”] may not always
be achievable at an acceptable cost . . . it nevertheless remains the ideal”). See generally LARRY TEMKIN,
INEQUALITY 245–82 (1993).
141
The term “telic equality” comes from Derek Parfit, to designate the view that “[i]t is in itself bad
if some people are worse off than others.” PARFIT, supra note 139, at 4. Parfit criticizes this view
primarily on the foregoing ground, namely that it is vulnerable to the leveling-down objection. This is
distinct from the following, deeper-going criticism, that the focus on sameness is fundamentally

520

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:2

it conflates a commitment to taking all persons’ lives to matter equally, and
thus to giving each person equal concern in political morality, with a
commitment to placing intrinsic value on achieving “sameness” in
outcomes.142 On an alternative view, the commitment to equal concern is
best understood as a commitment to enabling each person’s life to go as well
as is possible and fair. And what is fair is that those who are, through no
fault of their own, worse off than others be given priority because (and to
the extent that) they are worse off. This is not for the sake of equalizing, but
rather because their lower level gives them a more urgent moral claim to
improvements. And the urgency of that claim is always a comparative
matter, a question of how much worse off they are than other claimants or
potential recipients.143 With this change in perspective, differences in access
to outcomes are not by themselves a matter of regret, nor does leveling down
hold out any appeal, even prima facie.144 What distributive principle might
result from this alternative elaboration of the commitment to equal concern?
We return to this shortly, after reviewing the other major alternatives
currently available.
2. Maximized Potential: Maximin/Leximin
A close cousin to equal results, but one shorn of its leveling-down
implication, is that we should seek not to equalize access to outcomes, but

misplaced—so that it is no answer simply to address leveling-down concerns by, say, qualifying our
commitment to telic equality by allowing Pareto improvements (the “leximin” view discussed shortly).
See infra note 149 (describing “leximin” approach to equalizing outcomes). The deeper point is that this
commitment itself needs to be jettisoned and replaced by another to fundamentally reorient our
perspective and change entirely the basis and character of special concern owed to those worse off
through no fault of their own. See infra Part II.B.1. By contrast, Parfit takes the amended, “leximin,”
view just canvassed as reconcilable with his argument. PARFIT, supra note 139, at Appendix.
142
To avoid misunderstanding, it bears emphasizing that what is being rejected here is distributive
equality as intrinsically valuable. Distributive equality may still be instrumentally valuable, due, for
instance, to the impact of distributive inequality on access to positional goods, relative purchasing power,
or “relative deprivation” effects. And a commitment to equality in a more abstract (nondistributive) sense,
of affirming the equal moral worth or dignity of each person, and according each member of the political
community equal concern, is not in question. Rather, what is being questioned here is whether, in matters
of distributive justice, equal concern should mean we focus on “sameness” as valuable for its own sake.
(This also sets to one side the possibility that, for other questions of political morality, such as political
participation by citizens in democratic decision making, equalization may well be of intrinsic
importance.)
143
This emphasis on the moral significance of comparative levels—on the significance of some
persons being worse off than others, rather than simply badly off in some absolute sense—differentiates
the position being advanced here from that of others who also reject the telic equality commitment to
distributive equality as valuable in itself. See infra note 161 (differentiating the present view from noncomparative sufficiency and priority views).
144
Nor, to anticipate the following position, would we single-mindedly pursue only improvements
for the worse off, with no regard to what is possible and fair for others. That would only be sensible if
equalizing were our aim, which it is not even if it were attainable.
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145

rather to maximize the level of the worst off. This is the most common
interpretation of the Rowley district court’s “full opportunity” standard, with
“maximizing potential” being the formulation most frequently advanced—
and typically rejected—by the courts as an alternative to the “some” and
“meaningful” benefit standards.146 Instances of the position include the
mandate, formerly under Massachusetts’ law and still in force in North
Carolina, to provide students with disability access to “maximum possible
development” or “full opportunity” to develop their potential, and Pauley’s
interpretation of the West Virginia Constitution as requiring that each
student be developed up “to his or her capacity.”147
What these standards require is that we continue to devote educational
resources to the needs of students with disability so long as they remain
worse off than others and have any room for improvement. Once a ceiling
has been hit, we stop and use any remaining resources to benefit those
students who are already doing better.148 The appeal of such a “maximin”
145
See Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled, 74 GEO. L.J.
1435, 1473 (1986) (describing the “maximum potential” standard as a possible approach to equal
protection). This may be seen as a particular application of John Rawls’s “difference principle” of
distributive justice, which endorses only those inequalities that redound to the maximum benefit of the
worst off. Rawls, supra note 121, at 65. However, Rawls himself cautioned against such particularized
applications of the principle, restricting it to matters of overall distribution resulting from the “basic
structure” of society—to counsel maximizing the lifetime expectations in income and wealth of those
least advantaged in that respect. Moreover, he explicitly ruled out taking those with disabilities as the
“least advantaged” or “worst off” for purposes of applying “maximin”—understanding the principle to
be either undersolicitous, by focusing on income/wealth holdings without regard for conversion deficits,
or, if taking such deficits into account, untenable. The two main attempts to handle disability in the face
of the gap left by Rawls’s theory are those extending Rawls’s “resource” focus to handle disability, and,
what Rawls himself pointed to, the capability approach of Sen and Nussbaum. Both are evaluated, infra,
in Part III.B.
146
See Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Pub. Sch., 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding Rowley
precludes analysis of where the student would have made the most progress so long as the public school
confers “some educational benefit”); Hartmann v. Loudoun County Bd. of Ed., 118 F.3d 996, 1001 (4th
Cir. 1997) (“States must . . . confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child, but the Act
does not require the furnishing of every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s
potential.”); C.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 636 F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2011)
(“The statute does not require a school district to maximize a student’s potential or provide the best
possible education at public expense.”); Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171,
178 (3rd Cir. 1986) (stating that “[h]owever desirable the goal of maximizing each child’s
potential, . . . such a goal would be beyond the fiscal capacity of state and local governments” and is not
required either by the IDEA or Rowley”); Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 1999) (“IDEA
and case law interpreting the statute do not require potential maximizing services. Instead the law requires
only that the [plan] in place be reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful benefit on the child.”).
147
Supra notes 72, 73, and 75 and accompanying text.
148
Although the judicial formulations are open to alternative readings, this “maximin”
interpretation does seem the most plausible and apt. One alternative reading is to take the standards to be
urging that we simply seek to maximize, simultaneously, the potential of all students, with or without
disability. Given, however, that available educational resources will not suffice to enable all students to
maximize their potential, this view simply returns us to where we started, in search of priority rules to
decide between those falling short. Another possible interpretation is that we should focus on maximizing
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position is that it gives strong, indeed absolute, priority to the needs of those
students worst off due to disability, but without any attempt to achieve the
unattainable, or unattractive, equalization of access to outcomes.149
Yet this view still faces a distinct problem: taken strictly, the injunction
to enable Jamie’s “maximum possible development” means that so long as
we can achieve any improvement in his capacities through added
supplements to his educational program, we should continue to do so no
matter how small the improvements, nor how consuming of educational
resources the supplements. The concern this raises is clear, especially when
we consider, again, cases of more severe impairments that impact a wider
range of learning areas, thereby multiplying the areas of deficit and the
possible interventions for improvement: some students will have potentially
“insatiable needs,” presenting a so-called “bottomless pit” problem
requiring us to devote increasingly large amounts of educational resources
in pursuit of increasingly small, but still positive, educational gains.150 At
the potential of students with disability, continuing to do so even if their level surpasses that of other
students, without regard to the needs or potentials of others. This, then, would not be a “maximin” view,
but rather one that simply singles out one subset of students, those with disability, for maximization.
Indeed, this may well be what many courts discussing this standard in the IDEA context have in mind.
Such an approach, however, would still remain subject to the criticisms adduced in the text against the
maximin interpretation. And it would also face an additional burden: that of having to justify priority to
students with disability even when they are doing better than other students—a matter which we turn to
in Part III. We note in passing here that one important benefit of adopting a distributive-justice lens is
the sharper analytical purchase it provides, enabling us incisively to distinguish and evaluate the
alternative substantive positions plausibly lurking within any one formulation of an existing or proposed
legal standard.
149
Strictly speaking, this is perhaps better understood as a “leximin” rather than “maximin” view.
Maximin stipulates that departures from equality are only justified when they improve the absolute levels
of the worst off. See Rebell, supra note 145, at 1473 (describing the “maximum potential” standard).
Hence, even gains to the second-worst-off, which do not come at the expense of the absolute level of the
worst off but do increase the relative gap or inequality between the two, would not be justified. In other
words, maximin retains some leveling-down aspects. Leximin, on the other hand, allows such further
departures from equality, so long as the absolute level of the worst off is still maximized (i.e., it allows
Pareto improvements to qualify its commitment to telic equality). PARFIT, supra note 139, at 38. Leximin
counsels, then, that once the worst off have been maximized, we then move to improve the
second-worst-off, and so on. What matters here, however, is that both views share the commitment to
giving absolute priority to the worst off, maximizing their level. And for that commitment “maximin” is
the more familiar moniker, one that also resonates better with the “maximized potential” formulation. In
any case, the considerations advanced against this view here apply equally to maximin and leximin
variants.
150
See Jaime Ahlberg, Educational Justice for Students with Cognitive Disabilities, in EDUCATION:
IDEALS AND PRACTICES 150, 160 (David Schmidtz ed., 2014). Although this is frequently referred to as
the “bottomless pit” problem, that is somewhat of a misnomer analytically, as well as being an
unfortunate choice of words. A truly bottomless pit is one in which resources are essentially “thrown
away,” producing no benefit. Here however, the injunction is not to continue to devote resources to those
worse off even when it produces no benefit, simply because they are worse off—although such a view
does seem to have been taken by at least one court. See Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist.,
875 F.2d 954, 960–61 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding the IDEA does not contain a “prerequisite to being covered
by the Act, that a handicapped child must demonstrate that he or she will benefit” (internal quotation
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the limit, a small number of students with very high needs may exhaust a
school’s budget. And, indeed, such concerns have been expressed by courts
in jurisdictions governed by the “maximal potential” standard, to restrict
benefits in the face of what that standard, strictly interpreted, would seem to
require, although without any principled guidance as to how to do so.151
One might think that this takes too literal a view of “maximum possible
development,” and that a more sensible reading is to interpret “possible” in
a looser sense: as pointing to a notion of “plausible” or “feasible” maximal
development, one requiring some judgment of what is practical or
reasonable. Perhaps. Indeed, we will soon consider one such “reasonable”
reinterpretation of the standard.152 But what bears underlining here is that
any such alternative interpretation would need to identify what further
considerations are relevant to such judgments of reasonableness. And the
premises underlying the “maximin” approach are bereft of any such
additional criteria. By giving absolute priority to the worst off, it directs us
to focus solely on their levels, as the only relevant consideration. This, in
turn, is only plausibly anchored in the same normative orientation as the
equal-results view, namely the telic equality aspiration toward equalizing
outcomes, although now advanced in more muted form. The result remains
a single-minded focus on improvements for the worse off, with no regard to
what is possible and fair for others. The view discloses, in other words, no
other values relevant to determining when to stop short of maximin, nor is it
clear how any values brought in “from the outside” might be weighed
against its valuation of equalizing access to outcomes.

marks omitted)). Rather, the injunction is to continue so long as there is some, no matter how miniscule,
positive gain. A more apt alternative characterization of the issue, offered by Mark Stein, is that of
“insatiable needs.” Mark Stein, Nussbaum: A Utilitarian Critique, 50 B.C. L. REV. 489, 500 (2009). To
this should be appended “potentially” insatiable needs, to underline the point that, in principle, there may
be a limit or ceiling on such needs, even if it is unlikely to be reached in practice.
151
See Harrell v. Wilson Cty. Sch., 293 S.E.2d 687, 688, 691 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a
school need not reimburse funding to cover the cost of sending a hearing impaired student to “one of the
leading institutions in the world which teach deaf students” even under North Carolina’s “full potential”
standard, which, “as progressive as it may be, was not designed to require the development of a
utopian-educational program for handicapped students any more than the public schools are required to
provide utopian educational programs for non-handicapped students”).
152
See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
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3. Minimum Achievement: The Sufficiency View
In the face of these difficulties confronting equalization views, many
may be drawn to an altogether distinct notion of what it means to give each
person equal concern: what matters is not equality, but sufficiency, so that
our aim should be simply to ensure that each student is enabled to reach a
decent basic threshold level of achievement, irrespective of what level others
are able to reach. What matters, on this view, is that each student has access
to enough, not to the same.153
The nub, of course, is stipulating what should count as enough, in terms
of a decent threshold level of sufficient educational attainment. Among the
array of possible answers, the main options in this camp may be grouped
into two clusters: those settling on a more minimalist view, such as the
federal court decisions interpreting Rowley’s “some” benefit standard as
being satisfied by provision of some non-trivial benefit (most commonly,
enabling grade advancement),154 and those adopting a more robust
conception, such as those state courts interpreting their constitutions to
require that each student be equipped to realize a high degree of competence
across a range of dimensions deemed necessary for active participation in
social, economic, and political life.155 The central difficulty facing this
approach is plainly stated: any truly decent threshold will likely be too high
to be reached by many students with significant disability (or reachable only
at exorbitant cost), while any broadly attainable level will likely be too low
to satisfy us that, upon meeting it, we need show no further special concern
for those with disability. A robust sufficiency standard, in other words, will
tend to be over-inclusive, while a minimalist one will tend to be
under-inclusive.156
To illustrate, if we use grade advancement as our cut-off, then Jamie
may only merit Plan A, depending on the extent to which his scores in other
areas are able to compensate for the low ones in reading, enabling him to
attain a passing grade overall. To be sure, low reading ability might also
affect his performance in other dimensions, in which case the requirement
153

See Harry Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21, 21–22 (1987) (advancing the
“sufficiency view” that “[w]ith respect to the distribution of economic assets, what is important from the
point of view of morality is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough. If
everyone had enough, it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others”);
Elizabeth Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 288–89 (1999). See also references
cited in note 249, infra (discussing sufficiency approaches to educational equity).
154
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
155
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
156
A similar assessment was offered by the Supreme Court in Rowley with respect to one possible
threshold level, “self-sufficiency”: “Because many mildly handicapped children will achieve
self-sufficiency without state assistance while personal independence for the severely handicapped may
be an unreachable goal, ‘self-sufficiency’ as a substantive standard is at once an inadequate and an overly
demanding requirement.” Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 200 n.23 (1982).
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of grade advancement may have some bite. But even so, supposing that this
means Jamie now merits Plan B, should we really be satisfied when a
dyslexic student performing above average in other areas has, by grade five,
reached a reading and writing level that remains below that of a second
grader (1.8)? Or that at this rate by grade twelve his reading will hover in
the range between that of a fourth or fifth grader (4.6)? Does it not matter
what his potential is for further improvement under Plans C and D?157
Perhaps the problem lies, however, not with the minimum-achievement
approach but its application to the wrong zone of achievement. What if, that
is, instead of looking to overall grades/educational achievement in setting
the sufficiency threshold, we restricted our focus to those specific areas that
are impaired by the disability, and ensured that each of these reaches a decent
minimum? What would that decent minimum be here? Under Plan D,
Jamie’s reading/writing level in grade five will be at just that of a thirdgrader (3.0). Does that suffice? If we think not, on the view that a decent
minimum should be attaining one’s grade level in each distinct area, then we
have likely transitioned from the problems facing a minimalist view to those
facing a robust conception. That is, while enabling students to attain their
grade level across all core areas of skills and knowledge may be a more
adequate conception of a decent level,158 such a threshold will likely be
reachable for some students in some areas only at exorbitant cost, if at all.
Now in the case of Jamie, it may turn out to be reasonably reachable, by
supplementing Plan D with further assistance so as not only to maintain
steady grade-level progress but also gradually close the overall gap of two
grade levels. But to determine that, we would need to know what
considerations are relevant to assessing said reasonableness. And the
sufficiency approach, like the maximin view, is bereft of any such criteria,
being an “all-or-nothing” stance: those remaining below the threshold
continue receive, as with maximin, absolute priority (“all”), while once those
who can reach the threshold do so, they receive no further special concern
(“nothing”)—irrespective, in both cases, of the students’ potentials for
further improvement. Whether or not such restricted absolute priority would
be concerning in the case of Jamie, it is clear that for any decently robust
157

Cf. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit, 853 F.2d 171, 185 (3d Cir. 1988) (criticizing
approaches that evaluate adequacy of benefits under a “single standard” such as grade advancement, and
calling instead for adequacy to “be gauged in relation to [each] child’s potential”); Ridgewood Bd. of
Educ. v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasizing the same critique explained in
Polk, 853 F.2d at 185). These passages may be read not only to criticize a “single standard” view for
ignoring students’ potentials, but also to advocate looking solely to such potentials in determining
adequacy. However, the two points are distinct, and the latter position, which often devolves into a quasiutilitarian view, is critically evaluated infra Part II.B.3.
158
Although it would likely still fall short of the robust citizenship levels held by some state courts
as constitutionally required. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979) (outlining eight
dimensions of learning and skills in which all students must be robustly equipped); see also Lujan v.
Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 n.23 and accompanying text (Colo. 1982) (citing
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 859).
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threshold there will be some students with severe impairments, raising the
same “bottomless pit” concerns of potentially insatiable needs as under the
maximin view.
The appeal of the sufficiency approach lies in its identification of a
distinct reason, apart from the aspiration to equalize access, for according
special concern to students with disability: namely, that such students may
fall short of achieving what we think is some objectively important threshold
of educational capacity. The trouble, however, lies both in specifying what
that threshold is and in the blunt “all-or-nothing” attitude taken toward its
realization, with its corresponding disregard of any other considerations,
such as what students’ potentials for improvement may be, below or above
the threshold.
B. The Principle of Proportionate Progress
1. A New Fairness Premise
There is an another way forward from the commitment to equalize,
besides the sufficiency view. And this is to base our special concern for
students with disability not on their falling short of some objective threshold
of educational capacity, but rather on their doing comparatively less well
than others. Priority, on this view, is due to students with disability, not
because they are badly off according to some absolute yardstick, specified
independently of how other students might be doing. Rather, it is because,
and to the extent that, they are worse off than others as a result of their
disability. And importantly, to recall our earlier discussion, this basis
remains distinct from any commitment to equalize or give any significance
to distributive equality as valuable in itself.159 That commitment was
rejected as embodying a flawed understanding of what it means to give each
person equal concern, taking it to require a focus on “sameness” as somehow
intrinsically important, such that it is of value in itself that one person’s life
go as well as another’s. By contrast, on the present view, our commitment
to equal concern is better understood as a commitment to enabling each
person’s life to go as well as is possible and fair. And what is fair is that
those who are, through no fault of their own, worse off than others be given
priority—not because we aim to decrease inequality for its own
sake160—but because gains for a person, or improvements in their life, have
greater moral significance the lower their overall level is compared to that
of other potential recipients. Why? Because it speaks directly to the question
of fairness—of what it is reasonable to ask separate persons, leading distinct
159
See supra note 142 and accompanying text (critically evaluating the “telic equality”
commitment).
160
Although we may still wish to do so for various indirect or instrumental reasons, as discussed
above. See supra note 142.
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lives, to expect from and sacrifice for each other. Although equalizing does
not hold out any value, nevertheless, when deciding between two potential
recipients of resources, it is only reasonable that one whose life is already
going better than another’s understands that improvements for the latter
matter more—are of greater significance or urgency—precisely because
they are improvements to a life that is going less well.161
With this change in the normative basis for our concern comes a change
in the character of that concern: as opposed to giving students with disability
absolute priority (as under both the maximin and sufficiency principles), the
priority is now a matter of degree, being a function of how much worse off
such students are relative to others. The shift, that is, in the reason for our
concern sheds new light in determining the extent of that concern, or how
much priority is merited: since students with disability are given priority
because they are worse off, they are to be given priority to the extent that

161
Further, as discussed next, they matter more not only because of the respective gap in their overall
levels, but also, correspondingly, to the extent of that gap. This emphasis on the intrinsic moral
significance of comparative levels—on the significance of some persons being worse off than others,
rather than simply badly off in some absolute sense—distinguishes the present position from that of
sufficiency and non-comparative priority views that also reject telic equality. See Frankfurt, supra note
51, at 21–22 (advancing the “sufficiency view” that only absolute levels of wellbeing matter); PARFIT,
supra note 139, at 23 (“On the Priority view, we are concerned only with people’s absolute levels.”); id.
at 25 (putting forward the non-comparative priority view as a “more general version” of the “sufficiency
view” on which there is greater moral concern for benefiting people when “these people are at a lower
absolute level,” and not because “these people are worse off than others”).
The view being advanced here, then, carves out a distinct position in conceptual space from the
rival views widely thought to exhaust our options in distributive premises, namely: (a) the telic equality
view that equalizing is in itself of value, making relative levels matter; or (b) sufficiency and noncomparative priority views that equalizing is not valuable in itself, and so what matters are absolute not
relative levels. It does so by arguing that (c) relative levels do intrinsically matter, pace sufficiency and
non-comparative priority, but not, pace telic equality, because we should care about equalizing per se in
matters of distribution. Rather, it is because even though there is no value to equalizing in itself (pace
telic equality), distributive equity remains irreducibly relational (pace non-comparative views), since
gains for one are at the expense of sacrifices by another and comparative levels of wellbeing directly
speak to the fairness of such sacrifices, to what is reasonable for persons to expect from each other.
A representative statement of the standard view that our options are exhausted by the choice
between telic equality and non-comparative views is the following: “Prioritarians are concerned with the
absolute position of the worse off. A concern for equality, on the other hand, is concerned with people’s
position relative to others in some respect and that they be equal in that respect.” Dan Brock, Ethical
Issues in Applying Quantitative Models for Setting Priorities in Prevention, in ETHICS, PREVENTION AND
PUBLIC HEALTH (Angus Dawson & Marcel Verweij eds., 2007); see also G.A. COHEN, ON THE
CURRENCY OF EGALITARIAN JUSTICE AND OTHER ESSAYS 69–72 (Michael Ostuka ed., 2011)
(“egalitarians think inequality is intrinsically bad or wrong, and prioritarians do not”; the latter are
concerned only with “priority to the worst off,” making “comparativity strictly irrelevant” such that
“distributive patterns are of no intrinsic interest” (emphasis in original)). See generally Marc Fleurbaey,
Equality Versus Priority: How Relevant Is the Distinction?, 31 ECON. & PHIL. 203 (2015) (framing the
debate at the level of normative first principles as between telic equality and non-comparative priority
views, even while querying its policy relevance); Daniel Hausman, Equality Versus Priority:
A Misleading Distinction, 31 ECON & PHIL. 228 (2015) (same).
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they are worse off.162 They are to be given, in other words, comparative
priority: their claims on educational resources are greater the worse off they
are compared to other potential student recipients.
This, then, is the principle of proportionate progress. Students with
disability should have priority in access to educational resources so long as:
(a) the progress these resources would enable them to realize would, as a
proportion of their existing levels of development, be greater than or equal
to (b) the progress such resources would enable alternative recipients to
realize, as a proportion of their existing levels of development.
Under the principle, that is, those who are at comparatively lower levels
are given greater priority, which priority is applied to respective potentials
for improvement. Where the two factors, of comparative priority and
potentials, converge, the recipient is given especially strong priority.163
The principle directs us, to reiterate, to give priority to students with
disability not for the sake of equalizing, nor simply because they are badly
off in some non-comparative sense, but because, and to the extent that, they
are comparatively worse off. So long as a student remains at a lower level of
development than others, their gains continue to receive priority. At the same
time, however, the extent of the priority is a function of how much worse off
they are, and so, being a comparative matter, it is a relative, not absolute,
priority.
What would this principle mean in the case of Jamie? In determining
which plan is merited, it calls on us to compare two sets of relations. First,
by how much would each plan reasonably be calculated to improve Jamie’s
educational progress over his existing level? Second, how much educational
progress would the same resources reasonably be calculated to secure for an
average student without dyslexia, as a proportion of her or his level? For
each contemplated IEP (i.e., Plans A through D), in other words, we ask
whether the further proportionate progress it would enable Jamie to realize
is at least equal to the proportionate progress that would be realized by an
average student were the additional resources required for that IEP devoted
to them. Before receiving any special educational assistance, Jamie’s
reading and writing is at one-third the level of his peers on average (he is at
a grade-one level in grade three). Plan D, to take an example, would enable
Jamie to improve his reading and writing by a full grade level, a 100 percent
162
By contrast, if the reason for our concern is the aspiration to equalize, then the extent of that
concern or priority either remains unclear or, as under the maximin/leximin principles, is absolute.
Similarly for sufficiency views: if the reason for concern is that some are below an objective threshold,
then the extent of that concern or priority will tend either to be absolute (until they are brought up to the
threshold), or to remain unclear.
163
As may be the case, for instance, with early-stage accommodations like hearing aids, braille
modifications, and the like, that enable students with disabilities to make major gains in significant
dimensions of learning by addressing large, very salient barriers at comparatively low cost.
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164

increase in the first year. So long as its costs were not so high as to tie up
resources that would otherwise enable an average student to double her or
his level (moving up three grades), it would be merited.165
As we move forward under such an IEP, the gap between Jamie’s overall
level and those of others will hopefully diminish, and so, correspondingly,
would the priority given to his further improvements. To be clear, so long as
Jamie’s level remained below that of the average non-dyslexic student, gains
to him would continue to receive priority. Nevertheless, for that priority to
justify further accommodations, his additional improvements would also
need to be substantial enough: if his further progress from additional
accommodation decreases to the point of him realizing a smaller
proportional improvement over his level relative to the progress that an
average student would realize over her or his level from the same resources,
then we stop short of that further accommodation.166
In three fundamental respects, then, the proportionate progress view
differs from “equalized outcomes,” “maximized potential” and “minimal
achievement” positions. First, its basis for giving priority to students with
disability lies solely in their being worse off than others, rather than for the
sake of equalizing or because they are simply badly off in some noncomparative sense. Correspondingly, and second, this priority is not absolute
but relative, in accordance with how much worse off such students are
compared to other potential recipients. Finally, flowing out of this form of
comparative priority is consideration of an additional factor that the other
views do not take into account, namely students’ comparative potential for
progress, or their marginal improvements relative to other students.
Accordingly, the proportionate progress approach resolves the
bottomless-pit problem confronting these other views: students with severe
disability are given strong priority, reflecting the extent that their
impairment reduces their level of educational capacity below that of other
students, but that priority results in further accommodations only to the
extent that such students’ ability to reap gains, or realize progress, remains
comparatively significant. To be clear, such students will continue to get
priority even if their progress is modest, but only so long as the gap between
164

Possible refinements to this metric of comparison are explored infra Part III.
To keep the exposition simple, we evaluate Plan D against a baseline of doing nothing. In reality,
of course, the assessments will be more incrementally fine-grained, involving for instance comparison
of the further proportionate progress enabled for Jamie by Plan D over Plan C, with the proportionate
progress that would be enabled for an average student by the additional resources required by Plan D
over C. These real-world complications do not, however, affect the underlying substantive point.
166
For instance, suppose Plan D was implemented at the outset and Jamie continued to improve
under it by one grade level each year until grade five, bringing him up to a third-grade reading and writing
level as he enters grade six. At that point, his overall level is now one-half, rather than one-third, of the
average. Supposing the improvement enabled by Plan D remains constant at one grade level, the costs of
Plan D must be lower than the resources required to secure an average student a proportionate increase,
now, of two grade levels (as opposed to three). Continuing in this vein, it may become justified at some
point in time to shift Jamie to a lower-cost IEP, such as Plan C.
165
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their modest progress and the more substantial progress of other students
remains less than the gap between their respective overall levels.
This view also obviates the inverse problem to that of the bottomless pit,
namely the under-inclusiveness of those minimalist sufficiency views that,
in seeking to avoid robust sufficiency’s bottomless pit, over-correct in the
opposite, but equally rigid, direction. Opposite because they adopt a
relatively low (rather than robust) threshold; equally rigid because, below
the threshold, students are again accorded absolute priority, while above it
they get none. Here, the glaring problem is not with the absolute priority
accorded to students below the threshold, irrespective of their potentials for
further progress, but rather the absence of any priority for those above it,
despite their remaining worse off than other students (and again without any
regard for their potential). Comparative priority overcomes, in one sweep,
both sides of this “all-or-nothing” rigidity, and its concomitant defect of
ignoring comparative potentials.
2. Why not “Equal Progress”?
That the proportionate progress principle gives consideration not only to
students’ existing levels of achievement, but also to their potentials for
further improvement, is one feature that distinguishes it from the foregoing
alternatives. The way it factors in such potentials for improvement, however,
is also importantly distinct from other views that also look to improvements.
One such prominent alternative is the “same progress” or “equal added
benefits” view.167 Our aim, on this view, should be to ensure that students
with disability are enabled to realize the same absolute gains or
improvements, going forward, as other students, regardless of their
respective starting levels.
As should be readily apparent, this position will run into its own variant
of the “bottomless pit” problem facing the maximin and robust sufficiency
views: although the aim now is to equalize improvements or progress (rather
than overall results or attainment of a robust threshold), nevertheless for
many students with severe and/or multiple impairments, enabling them to
realize the same educational gains as other students going forward will likely
be prohibitively costly. Moreover, the underlying source of the difficulty is
the same: although the equal progress view does look to improvements,
unlike maximin and sufficiency views, it nevertheless fails, like these other
167
Such a view is advanced by Professors Silvers and Francis in their important effort to rehabilitate
disability accommodation under the ADA. See Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating
Alexander v. Choate: ‘Meaningful Access’ to Health Care for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 447, 453 (2008) (developing an interpretation of “meaningful access” to education, health and
mobility services under the ADA as requiring programs to provide something roughly akin to equal added
benefits for persons with and without disability, as an interpretation of “equal opportunities to use”); see
also Burbules and Lord, supra note 134, at 183 (formulating the “same progress” alternative); Umpstead,
A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 78, at 6–7 (same).
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views, to consider potentials for improvement. And it is potentials for
improvement, i.e., students’ promise of educational gains from a given
amount of educational resources, that, when compared across students,
reveal the educational opportunity costs of a given unit of expenditures, and
thereby provide one set of criteria relevant to determining the reasonableness
of such expenditures.
This failure to factor in potentials for improvement also leads the same
progress view to face its own version of an additional problem: inadequate
assistance to students who, despite realizing the same absolute
improvements as others, nevertheless remain worse off than these others
while still having significant potential for further improvements.168 The
same progress view, then, is in the odd position of being simultaneously
over- and under-inclusive.169
This stems from the fact that, unique among the alternatives, this view
is concerned with neither overall levels nor potentials for improvement.
Rather its focus is on a somewhat arbitrary third factor, added absolute
improvements, which are then mandated to be equalized. This is a view
without analogue in distributive justice theory. Indeed, the position seems to
be somewhat of a makeshift, an attempted “equality of opportunity”
compromise between formal equality of resources and substantive equality
of outcomes. More promising, however, than settling upon an arbitrary
“equal added benefits” as a stand-in for “equal opportunity,” would be to
reorient our entire focus, and forthrightly aim at ensuring substantive equity
of access to resources for educational development, and then specify the
considerations of distributional fairness relevant to such equitable access.
3. Why not “Efficient Progress”?
A final alternative that also looks to improvements, and indeed to
comparative potentials for improvements, is an “efficient progress” view.
Here the aim is to maximize, rather than equalize, progress across students.
A quasi-utilitarian approach, this view counsels departing from formal
equality of resources in tailoring educational plans for students with
disability only when the further resources provided such students would
yield for them greater marginal gains or progress than if the same resources
were expended on students without disability.170 Thus, for instance, the
provision of early-stage accommodations such as hearing aids, braille
modifications and the like, may be justified (even if they are quite costly) on
a plausible assessment that such accommodations will, by attending to such
168

This is a variation on the problem facing the minimal sufficiency view that, in response to the
over-inclusive character of a robust sufficiency standard, swings over to the other, under-inclusive, side
of the pendulum.
169
By contrast, the sufficiency view has two distinct variants, with the minimalist variant being
under- and the robust variant being over-inclusive.
170
C.f. MARK STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY: UTILITARIANISM AGAINST
EGALITARIANISM (2006).
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salient barriers, enable students with the affected disabilities to make major
gains in significant aspects of learning and skills. Additional expenditures
of similar magnitude on students without disability may well not yield as
high a set of marginal benefits.
Limiting assistance to such “high yield” interventions, however, would
fall considerably short of the sort of accommodations that most courts and
commentators routinely agree are merited.171 The reason? Stopping at that
point would leave most students with disability still much worse off than
others across a range of educational dimensions, in a manner that seems
clearly unsatisfactory. For instance, in our case it is unclear whether even
the lowest-cost Plan A, of supplemental remedial instruction, would be
merited since it improves Jamie’s reading only by 0.2 grade levels.172
The underlying problem here is the flaw with the utilitarian approach to
distributive justice more generally: namely, that it takes an implausibly onesided view of equal concern, treating persons equally solely in terms of their
ability to reap added, marginal benefits, with no consideration given to how
they are faring overall. And what propels this one-sided principle is,
ultimately, an underlying commitment to maximization for its own sake.173
In, however, the context of separate persons leading distinct lives, such a
“telic efficiency” commitment to maximization of some aggregate as
valuable in itself, makes as little sense as the “telic equality” commitment to
sameness as valuable in itself.174
4. A New View of Fairness
Just as the proportionate progress view departs, then, from equalizing
and sufficiency approaches on how to evaluate overall levels, so it departs
from the same and efficient progress views in how to evaluate added

171
See supra text accompanying notes 129–131 (explaining options for devising an appropriate IEP
based on a composite of case law).
172
See supra Table 1.
173
RAWLS, supra note 9, at 23.
174
Why? Because it is ultimately premised on a mistaken personification of society, as if there were
some supra-personal being that experiences the sum of benefits net of costs maximized across persons.
See id. at 19–24. But actually there are only individual persons, across whose distinct lives the benefits
and costs are traded off. And in evaluating such tradeoffs, it is highly implausible that we should not care
about how well or badly, overall, such persons’ distinct lives are going relative to one another.
Similar to telic equality, the telic efficiency commitment may find more or less qualified expression
in different distributive principles, each pursuing the commitment to a different extent. In parallel, that
is, with telic equality giving rise to equalized access, maximin, and leximin principles—with each
successive principle further muting its pursuit of the underlying commitment so as to take in account
additional difficulties it faces—so telic efficiency may generate principles of maximizing: (a) a sum total;
(b) the average; or (c) at the margins. In both cases, however, what is needed is not to qualify the
commitment with various ad-hoc adjustments to manage each new difficulty as it crops up, but rather to
jettison it altogether in favor an alternative underlying commitment that better captures our deeper sense
of what ultimately matters. The import of making that deeper shift is brought out in the following Section.
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improvements. Integrating these dual sets of departures, a new view of
fairness comes into focus.
On this view, our commitment at the deepest level of distributive justice
should be to give priority to those who are worse off through no fault of their
own because and to the extent that they are worse off. Not because we want
to equalize, but because it speaks to fairness, to what is reasonable to expect
separate persons leading distinct lives to expect from and sacrifice for one
another. Equalizing, for its own sake, is of no value. Similarly implausible
is maximization for its own sake. And while a focus on an absolute threshold
level of “decency” is initially more plausible, it finally proves untenable as
well, because what is decent is, ultimately, contextual to what is possible for
others and hence to what is fair—precisely, that is, to what comparative
priority directs our attention to.
Effecting such a fundamental shift at the level of our deepest
commitments generates, on the surface, a principle that provides more
persuasive prescriptions across the entire range of accommodation cases.
The principle does so because, being rooted in a more compelling
foundation, it organically—internal to its own commitments—identifies all
the relevant considerations, and so takes them into account in a
systematic—that is, comprehensive and consistent—fashion. By contrast to
each of the alternative principles, which focus one-sidedly on either levels
or improvements, the principle of proportionate priority automatically gives
consideration to both. Moreover, it does so in the right way—evaluating
levels in terms of comparative priority and improvements in terms of
comparative potentials—so as to integrate the two into an analysis of
equitable opportunity cost.175 The superiority of the proportionate priority
view resides, then, not only in the range of considerations it identifies as
relevant, but also in the way it handles them. And in both respects this owes,
ultimately, to the deeper reason it takes these considerations to matter.
What matters on this view is neither to equalize the overall levels of all
students, nor to maximize or “sufficientize” the levels of students with
disability; nor, for that matter, to equalize or maximize improvements across
175
Rival principles, by contrast, not only fail to take into account all the relevant considerations,
they also give inapt treatment to the ones they do single out for attention—with both these surface defects
stemming from deeper flaws, in their underlying commitments. Thus, maximin and sufficiency views
not only focus single mindedly on overall levels, but also give them absolute priority—thereby not only
failing to supply any criteria for how to factor in the costs of improvements, but flatly rejecting their
relevance altogether. Behind both shortcomings is an untenable concern with equality or decency, as
opposed to fairness as a comparative matter—for the latter, a focus on levels as a matter of comparative
priority automatically integrates a concern with improvements in terms of comparative potentials. From
the other direction, efficiency not only disregards levels to focus one sidedly on improvements, but also
pursues only cost-effective ones at that—this undergirded by its implausible devotion to the pursuit of a
maximized sum or average as valuable for its own sake, irrespective of fairness across persons. Finally,
equal progress’s aim of equalizing improvements—irrespective either of levels (or equity as comparative
priority) or of costs (equity as comparative potential)—stems from its lingering attachment to an
“equality” midway between formal opportunity and substantive outcomes.
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all students. Rather, it is to ensure that all students have access to meaningful
improvements. And the meaning of improvements is to be understood intersubjectively, within and across different students’ educational lives, in terms
both of how well or badly they are already doing and of how much or little
they stand to improve. Educational gains are to be understood, that is, in
terms what they signify for each person in the context of her or his own
development, compared to what the alternative gains for others would
signify for them in the context of their development.
5. How the Principle Makes Sense of Current Law
How does the proportionate progress view square with existing legal
formulations of the appropriate standard for IDEA benefits? For reasons just
given, it offers an especially attractive elaboration of the “meaningful”
standard, spelling out what considerations are relevant to determining
whether a benefit is “meaningful,” and, correspondingly, identifying
specific factors to structure the inquiry. In particular, the principle fills in the
crucial gap facing this standard, namely how to factor in what the standard
rightly emphasizes as a central consideration: students’ diverse potentials for
improvement. And it does so by bringing to light, for explicit consideration,
two further factors that, in its current form, the standard either outright
misses or implausibly leaves in the shadowy background: the “severity” of
a disability, in terms of the extent of its impact on a student’s educational
level,176 and the role of opportunity costs, which are now accounted for in a
principled way, to equitably discipline our pursuit of the aspiration to enable
students with disability to realize their full potential.
In a similar vein, the proportionate progress view also provides a new
lens with which to revisit a long-standing, and controversial, standard: the
one originally articulated by the district court in Rowley, that an IEP should
provide students with disability the “opportunity to achieve [their] full
potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.”177
As we have seen, the Supreme Court in Rowley rejected this “full
opportunity” view, interpreting it as a call for equalization of outcomes.178
Nevertheless, the formulation has proved influential, being adopted by
Justice White in his dissent in Rowley and continuing to exert a pull on state
legislatures and courts.179 Its sway is likely due to the promise held out by
176
Courts often overlook this factor to focus one sidedly on potentials for improvement and thus,
slide imperceptibly toward an “efficient progress” view.
177
Rowley I, 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d,
458 U.S. 176 (1982) (emphasis added).
178
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
179
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.1 (LEXIS through Session Laws 2017-56) (providing that
“[t]he goal of the State is to provide full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities”);
Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 215 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); Cone ex rel. Cone v. Randolph Cty. Sch.,
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the clause modifying “full opportunity,” a clause often dropped in
restatements of the standard but one that is clearly crucial to its meaning:
namely, that such full opportunity for students with disability should be
“commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.”180 The
promise of this clause lies in its aspiration to take care, in giving priority to
students with disability, to recognize the legitimate needs of others.
The proportionate progress view fulfills that promise by interpreting
“commensurate with others” to mean “taking into account the similarly
meaningful gains of others.” Any notion of “commensurate” gains involves,
that is, some sort of inter-subjective measure or assessment of the gains, an
evaluation of their significance across persons. And proportionate priority
offers a particularly apt way of undertaking that evaluation, directing us to
understand the interpersonal significance of students’ respective educational
gains by embedding them in the comparative context of how each student’s
educational development is going overall. In doing so, it articulates a notion
of commensuration as reciprocity: recipients of educational resources are
asked to compare what the further progress they might realize would signify
for them, in the context of their own lives, to what the alternative gains for
others would signify for them, in the context of their lives.181
Finally, the principle also provides, and for similar reasons, an attractive
elaboration of the “maximum possible development” standard, at least on a
non-literal reading of it that gestures toward some notion of “plausible” or
“feasible” maximal development.182 Proportionate progress supplies the
missing element of such a view, namely criteria for when further educational
developments for a student, despite being “possible,” cease to be “plausible”
or “feasible.” What is “plausible” for any one student should be understood
302 F. Supp. 2d 500, 509–10 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (citing the North Carolina statute and Justice White’s
dissenting opinion in Rowley to declare North Carolina’s policy as being to “ensure every child a fair and
full opportunity to reach his full potential”); Harrell v. Wilson Cty. Sch., 293 S.E.2d 687, 690 (N.C. App.
1982) (citing the North Carolina statute and Justice White’s dissenting opinion in Rowley to state that “a
handicapped child should be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with the
opportunity given other children”).
180
Rowley I, 483 F. Supp. at 534.
181
To prevent misunderstanding, it is of course not being claimed that the construal offered
here—how to give all students “full opportunity commensurate with others”—is the only plausible
interpretation of the “full opportunity” standard. Indeed, the standard has typically been construed in
rather different ways. Thus, on one common interpretation, it is a synonym for the “maximum possible
development” view in its strict, literal sense. And on another interpretation, it mandates accommodations
only so long as students with disability are able to reap greater marginal improvements than others.
Indeed, this latter, quasi-utilitarian view, may well often be the one that courts articulating the standard
have in mind, given that the cases where it is invoked often involve facts, such as in Rowley, where the
student with disability does seem to have comparatively greater potential for further marginal gains. The
claim being made here is that the proportionate priority view is not only reconcilable with the standard
but also, moreover, that it offers a particularly compelling elaboration of it.
182
See supra text accompanying note 152 (suggesting such a reading as “a more sensible”
interpretation of the standard).
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in terms of what is possible for other potential student recipients, and,
moreover, what is reasonably or fairly possible, meaning that we compare
not only the students’ respective potential gains, but also the overall levels
against which such gains are made.183 Such an elaboration dovetails
precisely with the gloss that some courts have given this standard, namely
that it be taken to require the maximal development of students with
disability in light of what is “reasonably possible [or] fair”184—but while
supplying, what these courts have been reticent to do, the considerations
relevant to determining when constraints on possible development are
reasonable or fair.
What of the “some” benefit standard? Clearly, the proportionate
progress principle is a move away from it, in the direction of a more robust
“meaningful,” or even “full” or “maximal” benefits standard, as many have
urged is both justified in principle as well as required by recent federal
legislative developments and under the constitutional and statutory law of
some states.185 Only now, that departure is made in a more principled way,
one that reinterprets and fleshes out these alternatives in a more determinate
and persuasive form.
Moreover, the principle also addresses the concerns that originally
animated the adoption of the “some” benefit standard to begin with,
centering on the need to place limits on the extent of accommodation
required. The Supreme Court’s emphasis in Rowley on the language of equal
opportunity—of a “basic floor of opportunity”186 or “open . . . door” of
access rather than “any particular level” of benefits187—and its adoption of
the amorphous “some” benefit criterion, was undergirded by two central
worries. The first was an uneasy sense that the only alternative to equality
of opportunity is a dreaded “equality of outcome.”188 As shown above,
however, the appropriate theoretical alternative, or supplement, to “equality
of opportunity” is not “equality of outcome,” but rather “equity of access”
to educational resources, analyzed in terms of distributive justice.189 And,
183
As opposed, say, to taking plausible or feasible to mean what is “efficiently possible,” which
would confer additional resources on a student only when they would yield greater marginal gains than
for any other student, without any consideration of the students’ respective overall levels.
184
Burke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 983 (4th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
185
See supra text accompanying notes 82–83 (discussing the commentary around state and federal
statutes and cases that have advocated or required for states to go beyond the “some benefit” standard in
Rowley II).
186
Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 198, 200 (1982).
187
See id. at 192 (explaining that the intent of the IDEA is “more to open the door of public
education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of
education once inside”).
188
See id. (citation omitted) (explaining that Congress recognized that “providing special
education . . . is not guaranteed to produce any particular outcome”).
189
See supra Part I.B.
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within that frame, virtually no distributive justice position endorses equality
of outcome. The proportionate progress view, in particular, rejects it on
multiple grounds.190 A second, related but distinct, concern was that of costs,
of how to legitimately impose a “ceiling” on expenditures for students with
disability once we go beyond a “basic floor.”191 Proportionate progress
shows precisely how to do so, in a disciplined yet principled way, bringing
to light the competing considerations and weighing them fairly.
Finally, a third concern appears to animate a number of courts that have
adopted the “some benefit” standard. Such courts emphasize the “severity”
of certain disabilities as a reason not only to shy away from more demanding
standards (even those short of “maximized development,” such as
“sufficient development”), but also for accepting as adequate only
“minimally” discernable benefits.192 In light of the foregoing analysis, we
can now see these courts to be, on the one hand, properly highlighting the
impact that severe disability may have on students’ comparative potential
(that is: if the severity of a disability prevents a student from making much
progress even at great expense, this is indeed a relevant factor weighing
against the expenditure). Yet on the other hand these courts should also now
be seen as having neglected to consider that severity also affects these
students’ comparative priority (the more severe the disability, the worse off
the student is, and hence the more urgent our concern). Proportionate
progress gives both considerations their due.

190

See supra pp. 34–38 (explaining that even when the ideal is adjusted to factor in individual
responsibility—thus shifting from equality of outcome to equality of access to outcomes—it remains
unattractive for three reasons: (1) its equalized access and maximin variants counsel “leveling down,”
i.e., reducing educational benefits for some without any corresponding gains for others, “simply for the
sake of equalizing”; (2) its leximin variant, while abstaining from leveling down, remains untenable in
giving absolute priority to the worst off, irrespective of the costs involved, for which it provides no
guidance on how to address; and (3) most fundamentally, lying at the root of its difficulties, is its mistaken
“telic equality” commitment to “distributive equality [as] . . . something valuable for its own sake,” so
that sameness rather than fairness is taken to be what matters (citations omitted)).
191
See Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)
(emphasizing resource constraints in holding that the IDEA “does not require a school district either to
maximize a student’s potential or provide the best possible education at public expense”); Lunceford v.
D.C. Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577, 1583 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) (rejecting the “best education
money can buy” view on the grounds that “resources are not infinite, and many other demands compete
for limited public funds”).
192
See, e.g., Hall ex rel. Hall v. Vance Cty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (1985) (suggesting that
minimal results are acceptable for the most severely handicapped children).
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III. EDUCATIONAL DISADVANTAGE & THE SPACES OF DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE
A. Complex Cases
Our discussion until now has focused on what may be considered a core
or central case: a student with a disability (such as dyslexia) who, on account
of that disability, is at a lower academic level than the average non-disabled
student, both in the specific learning area(s) directly affected by the
disability (such as reading and writing) and in her or his overall academic
performance (test scores or grades averaged across all subjects). But what if
a student, despite the disability, nevertheless performs at an average or
above-average level—either overall or, even, perhaps, in the specific
domain(s) negatively affected by the disability? Should he or she continue
to receive priority in the line for educational resources? If so, why and to
what extent?
Cases of this sort are not uncommon. Indeed, in Rowley, Amy’s aboveaverage grades were a major reason why the Court held that she did not merit
any further accommodation by way of an in-class interpreter.193 Similar
holdings include:
a dyslexic student found ineligible for IDEA benefits on account of
making the honor roll in junior high and high school, since that
indicated he “was performing . . . on average or above
average . . . even before the accommodations”;194
a “very bright” third-grade student with a “non-specific learning
disability [that] affected his development of reading skills” held not
to merit special education because, even “without any modifications
to the curriculum or any specialized instructions,” he was
“performing above grade level expectations in math and spelling,
between third and fourth grade levels in reading and at the third
grade level in writing”;195 and
a student with ADHD held ineligible on the grounds that “the
educational challenges the Student does have are not sufficiently
affecting her educational performance such as to keep her from
staying within the range of her peers.”196

193

Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 209–10 (1982).
Grant v. Saint James Parish Sch. Bd., No. CIV. A.99–3757, 2000 WL 1693632 at *1, *2, *5
(E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2000) (footnote omitted), aff’d, 273 F.3d 1102 (5th Cir. 2001).
195
Weston Pub. Sch. Dist., 34 Individuals with Disabilities L. Rep. (Labor Relations Press) ¶ 75,
at 272–74 (Mass. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals Feb. 2, 2001).
196
Northshore Sch. Dist., 35 Individuals with Disabilities L. Rep. (Labor Relations Press) ¶ 144,
at 567, 574 (Wash. State Educ. Agency July 18, 2001).
194
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Decisions like these represent the prevailing view: the “vast majority of
hearing officers and courts find that above average educational performance
means special education is not needed.”197
A contrary position has, however, been taken in some cases. These
include:
a student suffering from a “neurological impairment . . . hinder[ing]
his ability to process auditory information and engage in normal
language and thinking skills,” held eligible for special education
despite the fact that, due to having a “full scale IQ of 130,” he
performed at an overall average to above-average level;198
a “gifted child with very superior cognitive abilities” who, despite
performing well academically, was deemed eligible on account of
having “perceptual deficits” that “impact on educational progress,”
whereby his “language and cognition skills surpass his [existing,
perceptual-impaired] performance skills”;199
a “mentally gifted” student who, despite having overall success in
regular education, was deemed eligible for special education on
account of being diagnosed with a “specific learning disability in
the area of written expression” that resulted in “problems with the
rate and degree of completion of his written work”;200 and
a student with ADD who was denied special education by the school
district on account of performing average to above-average, but was
deemed eligible upon judicial review due to his dropping from
“Level I” to “Level III” courses, with the court holding that
“entitlement to IDEA services must be gauged in relation to the
child’s potential,” so that the school district “erred in focusing on
[his] grades while disregarding his potential.”201
What lies behind these different positions? The majority view, on its
face, is simply that when a student is above average, her or his disability can
no longer be said to “adversely affect” her or his “educational performance,”
as is required for eligibility for special education under the IDEA.202 The
minority, for its part, takes the view that so long as the disability may be
discerned to have any detrimental effect on performance, it is eligible for

197
Robert A. Garda, Jr., Untangling Eligibility Requirements Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 441, 502 (2004).
198
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Tullahoma City Sch., 9 F.3d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 1993).
199
Benjamin R., 508 Educ. of the Handicapped L. Rep. 183, 185 (Mass. State Educ. Agency Aug.
8, 1986).
200
Conrad Weiser Area Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ. 603 A.2d 701, 702, 705
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
201
W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Bruce C., 194 F. Supp. 2d 417, 418–19, 421 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
202
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (2017) (defining as a “disability” an impairment that “adversely affects a
child’s educational performance”); Garda, supra note 197 at 502ff (discussing majority position).
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redress under the IDEA.203 Stated on their own terms, neither position seems
very satisfactory: the majority view seems premised on a highly implausible
reading of “adversely affect”—surely a disability may still be said to be a
drag on performance even where a student is able to rise above it—while the
minority view seems impossibly demanding—when can the effect of a
disability ever be shown to have been eliminated or “fully remedied?”
Further, the debate between them lacks traction, starting and ending on rival
premises concerning the meaning of “adversely,” without any purposive
criteria offered by which to judge the substantive merits of their competing
interpretations.
Is there a way beyond the impasse? Yes. When viewed through the lens
of distributive justice theory, both the majority and minority positions can
be seen in fact to track, albeit inchoately, distinct positions concerning the
appropriate “space” or “index” of advantage for distributive concern.
Reconstructing these positions, then, in terms of their underlying distributive
premises offers a promising way forward, both for clarifying the substantive
stakes and for working toward a satisfactory resolution.
The distributive premises underlying the majority position are most
plausibly reconstructed as follows: The reason students with disability are
owed special concern is because we suppose that their disability
disadvantages them, vis-à-vis other, non-disabled, students, in terms of
educational development. The disability renders them, in other words,
“worse off” than others in the domain of educational development. When,
however, that no longer obtains—i.e., when such students are performing at
an average or higher academic level—then our basis for special concern
ceases and so, accordingly, should their eligibility for any priority in the
queue for educational resources.
The minority view, on the other hand, is most plausibly understood as
embracing a narrower, disability-specific, target space of concern than
“educational development” writ large. Here, the focus of special concern for
students with disability is simply the disability itself, as a source of
disadvantage vis-à-vis otherwise similar students who do not have that
disability. On this view, then, students with disability should remain eligible
for priority so long as some hampering effects of the disability remain
(i.e., so long as the disability’s deficits have not been fully remedied).
How should we decide between these views? Adopting the principle of
proportionate progress does not by itself conclusively resolve the matter. It
might seem on first glance that the principle fits better with the majority
view, given that the principle’s basis for priority is precisely that students
203

See, e.g., Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 215 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the IDEA
language that “special education” be “specifically designed . . . to meet the unique needs of a handicapped
child” should be interpreted as “intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least to the
extent . . . reasonably possible”); Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390, 408 (5th Cir. 2012)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (advocating “disability remediation”).
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with disability are, as a result of their disability, worse off than the average
non-disabled student in some relevant respect, here overall educational
development. And so, when students with disability are not, or are no longer,
worse off than the average in that respect, then, correspondingly, our special
concern and priority should cease.
But this simply begs the question: should “overall educational
development” be the relevant respect in which students with disability are to
be worse off, or disadvantaged, as to merit special concern and hence be
eligible for priority? Or should we instead adopt a more fine-grained view
of the relevant disadvantages associated with disability and,
correspondingly, continue to deem eligible for priority those with disability
so long as they remain worse off in these more narrowly-targeted
dimensions? Taking this latter route, the principle of proportionate progress
may fit quite well with the minority view.204
The principle of proportionate progress, in other words, is a distributive
principle, one that may be applied to different target spaces of distributive
concern. But the debate between the majority and minority views turns not,
at least in the first instance, on the appropriate principle of distributive equity
to apply in cases of disadvantage, but rather on what sort of disadvantage is
the appropriate focus of distributive concern. Their disagreement centers, in
other words, not on the extent of special concern or priority to be accorded
those who are worse off, but rather on the relevant respect in which students
are to be worse off as to be eligible for priority in the first place. And that
disagreement goes to a second, distinct, debate within distributive justice
theory from the one that has occupied us thus far.
Lying at the heart of distributive justice theory, that is, are two distinct
(albeit related) fundamental questions: What space(s) of the good, or
advantage, should it be our ultimate concern to provide access to as a matter
of distributive justice? And what principle(s) of distributive equity should
we apply to our chosen space(s) of concern, to ensure that access is fairly
provided for all?205 Our focus in this Article has been on the latter. In the
course of evaluating candidate answers to it in the preceding part, we simply
assumed—implicitly and provisionally—a particular answer to the question
regarding the space of concern, namely that “overall educational
development” was the appropriate index of advantage to which our
candidate principles were to apply. Shifting, however, from the core to more
complex cases requires us now to reconsider that provisional answer, and to
204

Although application of the principle to the minority’s target space would still fall short of
counseling what the minority position does in its main guise, full “disability remediation.” See infra note
243 (noting that applying the distributive principle to the minority view counsels continued priority only
to the degree called for by a student’s disability-specific capacity for improvement compared to that of
other students).
205
Or, put another way: what is the appropriate metric of advantage for distribution, and what is
the appropriate distributive function?
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reflect more explicitly on the question: what kinds of disadvantage should it
be our concern to redress in the context of expending educational resources?
B. Disability and the Spaces of Distributive Justice
That question ultimately resolves, as we shall soon see (in Section C
below), into two sub-parts: (a) how should we measure and compare
particular dimensions of educational progress or development; and (b) what
barriers to educational progress should we seek to ameliorate? And lying at
the back of each of these is a farther-reaching, more abstract query: (a) what
is the appropriate index of advantage for distributive justice; and (b) which
sources of disadvantage are eligible for distributive redress? Since the
considerations relevant to answering these have been forged in the course of
more general debates on distributive justice and disability, a brief distillation
of those general debates is in order before turning to the questions as they
are specifically posed in the educational context.
Disability is best conceived in terms of a three-way relationship,
between: (a) individuals’ physical and mental constitution; (b) their natural,
built and institutional environment; and (c) social policy.206 An impairment,
on this view, is any significant “loss of”207—or, perhaps better, simply
“departure from”—“normal” or “species-typical” mental or physical
functioning.208 Such impairment becomes a disability when, through the
course of a person’s interaction with his or her architectural and institutional
environment, the departure translates into a disadvantage vis-à-vis those

206 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP 423–24 (2006) (drawing on disability literature to distill a conceptualization broadly along
these lines); SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 18–20, 34 (2009) (adumbrating the social model).
207 NUSSBAUM, supra note 206, at 423 n.5.
208 To speak of disability in terms of a “departure from”—rather than a “loss of”—typical
functioning is to register the insights of the social model of disability, concerning the potentially
naturalizing and stigmatizing ways in which certain deviations from statistical averages and social norms
are characterized. See, e.g., BAGENSTOS, supra note 206, at 18–19 (“Where disability is treated as a
medical condition or functional deficit, it is readily seen as a ‘personal tragedy’ . . . . [T]he view of
disability as a personal tragedy obscures the social practices that exclude ‘the disabled’ from the
opportunity to participate fully in society.”); MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT:
A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH (1990); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,”
86 VA. L. REV. 397, 436 (2000) (“[S]ocial practices that attach systematic disadvantage to particular
impairments are what create the category of people with disabilities.”) (emphasis in original);
Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 633 (1999) (“[S]tereotypes
about disability may be as much a barrier to individuals with disabilities as the impairments
themselves.”); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 599 (2004) (contrasting the social and medical models of
disability). The language of “normal” functioning is used in NUSSBAUM, supra note 206, at 432, and is
further explicated by Norm Daniels as “species-typical” functioning. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH:
MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 37 (2008).
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209

without the condition. And said disability becomes a handicap if the
disadvantage is not socially redressed.210 The upshot of this view, then, is an
aspiration for social policy: to limit the extent to which departures from the
norm (impairments) become injustices (handicaps), by providing equitable
redress when such departures show up as disadvantages (disabilities).
To pursue this aspiration with clear-sighted principle, however, we need
to bring into sharper relief which precise forms of disadvantage from
disability properly fall within the ambit of distributive justice. Doing so
requires linking up the foregoing with a wider analysis of the dimensions
and sources of disadvantage that, more broadly, are germane to distributive
justice. Debate on that score in the philosophical literature has yielded three
main candidates of the appropriate index of advantage—welfare, resources,
and capabilities—deficits in which are eligible for distributive redress.211
Prosecuted at a high level of conceptual refinement, the upshot of that
debate for present purposes is two-fold: convergence on one important set
of issues and division over some remaining, subtle yet significant, points of
contention. First, convergence: proponents of each of the main candidates
agree that fairness requires holding individuals reasonably responsible in
certain respects, principally: for which of their powers or capacities they
develop and exercise, for which of their traits and preferences they cultivate
and pursue, and for the prudent management of their affairs.212 All sides
209 This causal emphasis on the role of interactions between a person and their built and social
environment in transforming departures into disadvantages—as opposed to a view that sees
disadvantages as stemming solely from a person’s own constitution—is a central theme of the social
model literature cited above.
210 Cf. NUSSBAUM, supra note 206, at 423 (defining a “handicap” as the competitive disadvantage
resulting from a disability).
211 A significant catalyst of this debate has been the set of issues raised by disability and related
cases of differential needs. See Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, Address at The Tanner Lecture on
Human Values, 203–04, 215, 217–18 (May 22, 1979) (drawing on examples of special-needs individuals
to launch a debate between welfare, resource, and capability views).
212 Taking the lead in this regard are advocates of “resources.” See RAKOWSKI, supra note 140;
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 297 (1981),
reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 86
(2000). For agreement by defenders of welfare, see Arneson, supra note 137, at 77; Cohen, supra note
137, at 907. For capability theorists, see G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and
Capabilities, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 9–10 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993);
Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of)
Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1199–1203 (1997); Amartya K. Sen, Plural Utility, 81 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 193, 209 (1981). Rawls is famously thought to be an important exception, and to
reject any role for individual responsibility in distributive justice on deterministic grounds. But this is
slightly misleading, in two respects. First, Rawls believed individuals should be held reasonably
responsible for the tastes they cultivate and pursue. John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 159, 168–69 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). And, second,
although Rawls discounted any role in his theory for responsibility over the development and exercise of
one’s capacities, his reasons for doing so were not a flat rejection of any such responsibility, but rather
that it was simply “impracticable” to disentangle the (likely small) role of responsibility from other
factors lying outside of individuals’ control. See RAWLS, supra note 9, at 89, 274. For criticisms of Rawls
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agree, that is, that the locus of distributive concern should be on unchosen
or “involuntary” sources of advantage and disadvantage.213 We may signal
this, as we have throughout, by describing our aim in the language of
enabling effective access to valuable outcomes, rather than in terms of
securing the realization of outcomes per se.214
Where disagreement enters is in specifying the precise dimension(s) of
advantage in which involuntary deficits are to be equitably redressed. A
complex dialectic divides the three camps on this front; its central thread
may be radically compressed as follows. For one group, the only sensible
ultimate aim is to enable people to realize happiness according to their own
lights, and so the proper index of advantage—to which all persons should be
given equitable access—is subjective “utility” or “welfare,” understood as
either preference satisfaction or hedonic enjoyment.215 Two objections
facing this view, in particular, have been fundamental in prompting the
search for alternatives.216 One is the long-standing difficulty of obtaining
any reliable measure of such subjective utility, one that enables not just
ordinal or qualitative rankings internal to a person, but cardinal comparisons
of quantitative intensity, across persons.217 The other is a sense that, in any
case, a focus on subjective end-states is ultimately misplaced for two distinct
sets of reasons: (1) It holds hostage the value of an array of goods widely
held to be important across different plans of life (from physical mobility to
occupational opportunity) to the vagaries of persons’ subjective mental
reactions or preferences—something especially troubling when such
in this latter respect, see Cohen, supra note 137, at 915, and Dworkin, supra, at 343. For Rawlsian
criticism, in turn, of the emphasis placed on individual responsibility by theorists in the line of Dworkin
and Cohen, see Anderson, supra note 153, at 308–11.
213 This is not to say that all those cited above agree on the precise respects in which individuals
should be held reasonably responsible (or, where responsibility is a relevant consideration, on how to
factor it in). But any such local differences are of less moment, for present purposes, than their broad
areas of agreement on this front. Cf. infra note 244.
214 See supra text accompanying notes 118, 137.
215 See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 315–16 (1955); Arneson, supra note 137, at 82 (“I take
welfare to be preference satisfaction. The more an individual’s preferences are satisfied, as weighted by
their importance to that very individual, the higher her welfare.”); Kenneth J. Arrow, Some
Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 245, 252–54 (1973) (book review);
Louis Kaplow, Primary Goods, Capabilities, . . . or Well-Being?, 116 PHIL. REV. 603 (2007).
216
Two other important criticisms of the view—namely, that it is prone to giving weight to
“offensive” and “expensive” preferences—are addressed by those who propose to launder or filter these
out, on the basis of holding individuals reasonably responsible for not cultivating or pursuing them, or
for shouldering the burden of their disregard in social policy. Arneson, supra note 137, at 78–80;
Cohen, supra note 137, at 912–14.
217
See RAWLS, supra note 8, at 78–79 (motivating the case for “primary goods”—in particular, the
resources of income and wealth—as the index of advantage for distributive justice based in substantial
part on the need for an externally verifiable metric of advantage that has lower informational demands
than interpersonal comparisons of cardinal utility).
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reactions or preferences either (a) reflect a low valuation of the good, on
account of adapting to its dearth (in adverse or oppressive circumstances),218
or (b) are subject to being shaped by the very policy decision at hand (such
as with the education of the young);219 and (2) it disconcertingly threatens to
overextend the reach of distributive justice, making it a matter of political
concern whether, for instance, someone happens to be unlucky in love.220
United in their criticisms of these perceived defects, partisans of the
alternative camps divide over their proposed remedies. For both groups, the
basic picture of persons as vessels of utility is entirely too passive and in
need of replacement, by a conception of persons as active agents,
responsibly authoring their own lives. Our focus, that is, should not be on
providing access to end-states of happiness, but rather on effectively
equipping persons with the means necessary for freedom or flourishing.221
One camp takes this to require that all persons be equitably furnished
with “resources”: general, all-purpose means valuable for the pursuit of any
of a wide array of diverse life plans.222 These consist primarily of income
and wealth, but such “external” resources may also be used to address
involuntary deficits in “internal” or personal resources, meaning mental and
physical powers, and traits relevant to the effective pursuit of diverse life
plans.223 This, of course, reintroduces the thorny problem of measurement
or valuation: how should various deficits in personal powers and traits be
valued for purposes of monetary redress? In theory, the resourcist ideal is to
retain a subjectivist view, anchored in individuals’ own valuations of
personal resources, in terms of opportunity costs in foregone external
resources.224 In practice, however, the difficulties with directly
implementing this ideal mean that we will have to rely on rough, often
counterfactual, conjectures of inter-subjective averages as our guides—
218

See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 129–30, 136–37 (2000)
(discussing adaptation to oppressive circumstances); Cohen, supra note 137, at 943 (arguing that
adapting to adverse or oppressive circumstances should not void one’s claim to compensation).
219
See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1733–34, 1733 n.316 (1988) (discussing endogenous preferences).
220
Anderson, supra note 153, at 287–88.
221
But see Cohen, supra note 212, at 22–26 (criticizing the “overly athletic” language of freedom
used by resource and capability camps, as either mistaken if it means not redressing deficits in “traits”
along with those in “powers,” or misleading if it does).
222
RAKOWSKI, supra note 140, at 19; Dworkin, supra note 212, at 307, 343–44;
Rawls, supra note 210.
223
Broadening the ambit of “resources” to include personal powers and traits is an extension of this
view, undertaken by Dworkin and Rakowski to fill a gap in its original formulation by Rawls—who put
to one side the problem of personal differences to focus on what he considered the “basic case” of
“normal” persons. RAKOWSKI, supra note 140, at 99–101; Dworkin, supra note 212, at 300–01;
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (2001).
224
We are to ask, that is, what individuals with these deficits would themselves, in light of their
particular ambitions and tastes, give up in external resources—and hence, in the pursuit of their other
projects and preferences—to have these deficits ameliorated.
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asking, in essence, how much value would individuals, on average, across a
diverse range of life plans, place on ameliorating such deficits.225
Disagreement on this last count is the main pivot of debate between the
resource and capability views. Capability theorists agree with (indeed,
largely initiated) the critique of the welfare view as too focused on subjective
end-states.226 But in their reaction against subjective end-states, resourcists,
on the capability view, swing too far in the other direction, of “fetishizing”
generic external means independent of what they can actually do for specific
persons.227 The right locus of concern, on this view, lies midway between
external means and subjective end-states: states of valuable
“functioning”—of “being” (e.g., well-fed) and “doing” (e.g., reading,
mobility)—that are tailored to individual persons and yet externally
measurable and not reducible to their subjective satisfaction or enjoyment.
Thus, for example, with respect to being well-fed, our focus should be
neither on a generic quantity of external resources (be it dollars or food), nor
on a person’s desire for or pleasure from a meal, but rather on a nutritional
target (say, daily caloric needs), reaching which may require calibration to
individual differences in, say, physiology.228 And what value should we
place on meeting such targets? The capability answer is that we cannot
shrink from—because there is no plausible alternative to—straightforwardly
making substantive social judgments, concerning the contribution of various
different states of being and doing to the good life, a life of “truly human”

225

See Dworkin, supra note 212, at 293, 296–99; RAKOWSKI, supra note 140, at 88–89, 92, 98–
100, 120–23, 126. At the center of both Dworkin’s and Rakowski’s proposals are hypothetical insurance
devices that ask how much people would insure, on average, against the bad “brute luck” of an
involuntary disability or health condition. Dworkin, supra note 212, at 315; RAKOWSKI, supra note 140,
at 132. Reliance on “offer” prices under ex ante uncertainty is, however, only one way to obtain
conjectural (inter-)subjective valuations, and this particular method will tend to counsel only costeffective ameliorations, to result in a distributive principle along the lines of the “efficient progress”
view. See supra pp. 46–47 (criticizing the efficient-progress view). Both authors express reservations
about the method (and Rakowski proposes to supplement it with additional resource transfers of an
indeterminate amount for the case of childhood, as opposed to adult-onset, disability)—but they urge it
as superior to attempting full equalization or compensation. RAKOWSKI, supra note 140, at 99–101, 105;
Dworkin, supra note 212, at 300–02. The trouble here lies not with the authors’ chosen space of
concern—personal resources valued on a subjective basis—but, of course, with their telic-equality
premise that the default is equalization in that space. The unattractive implications of that premise then
drive them to adopt a method of subjective valuation that results in a concededly unsatisfactory
alternative distribution. A better way forward, on the argument presented in Part II, would be to simply
abandon the commitment to equalizing and instead embrace the commitment to giving comparative
priority, so as to apply the principle of proportionate progress to their space of concern, i.e., personal
resources, now (inter-)subjectively valued in a suitably revised way. See supra p. 44.
226
See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
227
Sen, supra note 191, at 216, 218. As discussed in note 230, infra, this criticism may be restricted
to cases of significant differences in individual powers and traits, or it may be pitched more broadly.
228
Sen, supra note 191, at 216–18; Cohen, supra note 212, at 18–20.
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229

functioning.
All persons, then, should be fairly equipped with
“capabilities” for such functioning—meaning, equitably enabled to realize a
diverse array of valuable states of being and doing deemed fundamental to
human flourishing.230
To be sure, the gap between resource and capability views, as well as
the distance between them and the welfare position, may be challenged or
bridged in various ways.231 But for present purposes, the central contours of
the competing positions are clear enough for us to turn to their concrete
implications here.232 Involuntary disadvantages from disability are, then,
229
SEN, supra note 6, at 1–2, 4–5; Nussbaum, supra note 218; Cohen, supra note 212, at 21–28.
For the contemporaneous development in legal theory of a view along similar lines to the capability
approach, see Fisher, supra note 219, at 1744–66.
230
This is not to say that capability views need leave no room in distributive justice for subjective
valuations over generic resources. That depends on the extent of their departure from resource views,
which may proceed along any one of three broad levels. The most basic is to restrict the capability
approach to those cases where both camps agree that differences in personal powers and traits render
inadequate reliance on generic external resources—with the disagreement turning on how best to address
that gap (i.e., via more subjective or more substantive valuations). An intermediate position is to expand
the zone of substantive evaluations to various other states of being and doing that are also deemed
fundamental to human flourishing and not to be left solely to subjective valuations (on account, say, of
adaptive or endogenous preference-formation)—while still leaving room for the residual application of
principles of distributive equity to generic resources left to subjective valuation. The most expansive
view would be to limit the scope of distributive justice only to capability spaces, evaluated in substantive
terms.
231
Thus, with respect to redressing deficits in personal “powers,” to the extent that the resource
position moves away from any purely subjectivist valuation, it can be seen to converge with the capability
view—or, as some resourcists have it, the capability view converges with theirs. Compare Sen, supra
note 211, at 217–18 (discussing the relation between utility, resource and capability views), with
Dworkin, supra note 137, at 241–42 (same), Cohen, supra note 137, at 918 (same), DWORKIN, supra
note 222, at 288, 296–98 (same), and AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 264–65 (2009) (commenting
on Dworkin’s argument against capability). As we will see below, however, an important difference of
sensibility in valuation—concerning “fungibility”—remains between these positions, one with
significant implications in the educational setting. See infra notes 237–39 and accompanying text.
Another prominent controversy, passed over as too tangential to our purposes here, concerns the extent
to which, under the resource and capability views, redress should be available not only for deficits in
personal “powers” but also in “traits” (such as having a gloomy disposition or unchosen “expensive
tastes”)—and, if redress for the latter is available, whether this does not collapse these positions, at least
in this regard, into something like a welfare view. For resources, see Dworkin, supra note 212, at 301–
04; Cohen, supra note 137, at 922–31; RAKOWSKI, supra note 140, at 47–54; G.A. Cohen, Expensive
Taste Rides Again, in DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS: WITH REPLIES BY DWORKIN 3, 5 (Justine Burley ed.,
2004). For capability, see Cohen, supra note 212, at 26–28. This is tangential to our focus because all
parties to this debate agree that deficits in traits associated with disability should be addressed by resource
and capability views and can be done so in a manner retaining their distinction from the welfare
position—although, again, not perhaps their distinction from each other. Cf. Cohen, supra note 212, at
22–26 (agreeing that the capability view may remain distinct from the welfare view in redressing deficits
in traits, but arguing that when dealing with traits or “beings”—as opposed to powers or “doings”—the
language of “capability” for “functioning” is inapt, because misleadingly “athletic,” and proposing
instead access to “midfare” as more suitable in such cases).
232
We may note for completeness that one final front of debate concerns, naturally, the appropriate
principle of distributive equity to apply to these competing spaces of concern—to ensure that access to
advantage, however specified, is indeed provided fairly for all. Virtually all participants in this debate
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germane targets for distributive concern when they implicate persons’ access
to one or another of these three ultimate goods: welfare, resources or
capabilities. And in the specific context of education, to which we now
return, the key questions concern the ways and extent to which different
forms of educational (dis)advantage may be measured and compared or
traded off against one another, in light of competing views on what
dimensions and sources of (dis)advantage should be our focus of concern in
the educational setting.
C. Accommodation Beyond the Core Case
1. Trading Off Across Educational Spaces
We return to the issue posed by the more complex cases: should a
student with a disability be eligible to receive IEP benefits even when he or
she is performing at an overall academic level that is average or above?233
have adopted—either as overall principles for their spaces of concern or specifically to address
disadvantages from disability—variations of the maximin/leximin, sufficiency or efficiency principles
criticized in Part II, supra. The burden of that Part, of course, was to argue for the superiority of the
principle of proportionate priority to these alternatives—and the central thrust of its argument continues
to apply irrespective of one’s view of the appropriate index of advantage to which equitable access should
be provided.
233
The question itself may arise under either of two aspects of the IDEA. A first is where the student
is performing at an average or higher level prior to any IEP, in which case the issue is whether they
should be eligible to receive any special education benefits at all. The second is when the student reaches
that level only after some special educational assistance, in which case the question becomes whether
they merit any further assistance.* While this difference—between “eligibility” for any benefits and
“adequacy” of existing benefits—may matter in certain contexts, we can abstract from it here to focus
on the core substantive question presented in either setting: should any (further) special-educational
resources be devoted to a student with a disability when her or his overall educational development is
already at an average or above-average level?
* To be more precise, the issue may arise under any of three distinct legal provisions of the IDEA,
falling within two broad areas of IDEA analysis, namely: (1) whether a student is eligible for an IEP’s
“special education and related services,” and (2) whether the benefits provided by a mandated IEP are
adequate. Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 187–88, 192–94 (1982). For eligibility, (1) a student must suffer from
a statutorily enumerated “learning” disability (or fall within a limited exception where states may at their
discretion so designate children aged three to nine who are “experiencing developmental delays”) and
(2) the disability must (a) “adversely affect” her or his “educational performance” (b) such that she or he
“by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.” 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012);
id. at § 1401(3)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.8(a)(1), (c)(1) (2016); see also Garda, supra note 197, at 457–
58 (describing how IDEA defines a “child with a disability”). Eligibility analysis serves, then, as a first
filter for special educational benefits, by determining who is entitled to receive any such benefits.
Adequacy analysis then operates as a second filter, prescribing how much benefits are due for those
passing the first hurdle.
The eligibility filter, in turn, may operate in either of two ways. One is where the requirement that
a learning disability “adversely affect” a student’s educational performance is given a restricted meaning,
not to require something more than simply making the student educationally worse off than they would
otherwise be without the disability, but rather something along the lines of the student being educationally
worse off than the average student, either overall or in specific areas of learning and skills. Alternatively,
we might take a relaxed or expansive view of what counts as “adversely affecting” educational
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So far we have encountered two broad answers. A reconstructed
majority view says “no,” on the grounds that students with disability should
be eligible for special concern or priority only so long as they are overall
worse off than the average, non-disabled, student. And a reconstructed
minority view says “yes,” on the grounds that students with disability should
be eligible for special concern or priority so long as they are worse off than
they would otherwise be, without the disability (i.e., so long as they are
detrimentally affected by the disability, even if their overall level is average
or above).
Both these responses, however, may be too coarse-grained when we take
into account the variety of cases that can arise. Consider the following,
illustrative of the main types of distinct cases possible here:
Case (A): The disability makes the student below average in many,
even most, areas of learning or skills, but still not overall, due to her
or him being very above average in one or a few areas (e.g., a student
with autism having extremely high math and related skills).
Case (B): The disability makes the student below average in one or
a few concentrated areas (e.g., reading or writing) but not overall,
due to her or him being above average enough in other areas.
Case (C): The disability causes deficits in one or more capacities
(such as in processing auditory information or perceptual skills) but
these are not tightly linked or severe enough to show up as discrete
deficits in any specific educational area sufficient to make her or
him below average in that isolated respect. Rather, the disability has
a diffuse impact that, nevertheless, does not result in he or she being
below-average overall (due to he or she having compensating
above-average capacities in other respects). 234
On first impression, the majority view would seem to counsel the same
position in all three cases, against the student being eligible for any special
concern or priority, on the same grounds that they are overall average or
above average. Why? Because, although students with disabilities may still
face deficits or disadvantages in some capacities that are relevant to
educational development and distributive concern, the fact that on the whole
they are nevertheless average or above suggests that in other respects they
are “gifted.” They enjoy, that is, in these other educational respects—that
are also relevant to distributive concern—surpluses or advantages vis-à-vis
performance (to include any detrimental effect on the student’s performance), but then take a more
stringent view of when the student is deemed to “need” special education, as requiring something more
than simply deriving any benefit from such education, but rather something along the lines of needing it
to attain an average level of overall or disability-specific performance. See Garda, supra note 197, at
481–91 (reviewing authority for each of the two approaches and advocating for the latter as the key filter
in eligibility analysis).
234
See Conrad Weiser Area Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 603 A.2d 701, 702, 704 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1992) (discussing a student who was “gifted” but deficient in “the area of writing expression”).
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other students, advantages that, on the whole, more than offset their
disability deficits. As a result, they are no longer disadvantaged, “overall.”
Even for those who find this view generally persuasive, however, case
(A) may give some pause. (A)-type cases, involving very lopsided
development of skills and learning, raise doubts about the propriety of using
a raw average across all areas, due to the potential distortion from a huge
surplus in one area. An overall average, that is, may sometimes be deceptive
due to raw educational scores not properly tracking the underlying value of
attainments in different educational domains, as these might be assessed on
any plausible theory of the educational good. By analogy to the diminishing
marginal utility value of money, there may be a diminishing “marginal
goodness value” of raw educational scores, whether “goodness” is
understood in terms of capabilities, personal resources or welfare.235
Therefore, before trading off deficits and surpluses across educational areas
to determine a student’s overall score and position vis-à-vis others, we may
first need to ensure that each area is being properly valued or adjusted. This
may be achieved more qualitatively, by making rough judgments of when
there seems to be too high an imbalance across areas—i.e., a concentration
of surpluses or deficits in one or a few that merits some adjustment before
averaging—or more quantitatively, by applying some discounting function
to raw scores before averaging them.
Suppose, then, that we have properly valued or adjusted distinct
educational areas before comparing deficits and surpluses across them to
yield an overall average. This already provides some distance from the
majority view in its initial, unrefined version. Do there remain any further
grounds for departing from that view, so as to accord eligibility for priority
to students with disability even when they are average or above in the, now
properly valued or adjusted, space of overall educational performance? A
refined majority view would say to stop here.
Some, however, may want to press further and argue for continued
eligibility in at least some type-(B) cases, where a student is doing well
enough in most areas but quite poorly in one or a few, albeit not so poorly
as to bring down her or his overall average to below the median (even after
we have made any plausible adjustments to raw scores before averaging).236
235

To forestall misunderstanding, it is worth emphasizing that this question—of how properly to
measure the benefits secured by an expenditure of educational resources—is sharply distinct from the
question at the heart of our discussion of distributive principles in Part II, namely what kind of priority
to accord to benefits (so measured) for students with disability vis-à-vis benefits for other students. By
way of analogy: within welfarist analysis, the (positive) question of what utility curves are most plausibly
associated with money is distinct from the (normative) question of what distribution of utility should be
deemed fair, for purposes of adopting a specific social-welfare function.
236
Cf. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390, 392, 400, 408–09 (5th Cir. 2012) (student
scoring quite well in most areas, including math and social studies, but consistently poorly in writing
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What might lie behind this position, of basing eligibility not on disadvantage
in overall educational development, but on disadvantages specific to discrete
areas of learning and skills? Most plausibly, a sense that not only should we
make adjustments in our valuation of raw scores before averaging them
across areas, but also that in fact we should go farther and sharply curb
tradeoffs across areas of learning or skills altogether, even when they are
duly adjusted or valued. Why? Because such skills and learning are
“incommensurable,” going to fundamentally distinct aspects of educational
development, each having independent qualitative value that is not sensibly
compared or traded off against the others.237 In other words, this position
counsels that we adopt a kind of “sphere-specificity” approach to areas
within educational advantage, as opposed only to between education and
other domains (e.g., health), as was discussed above.238
Proponents of two of the three prominent candidate metrics of
distributive justice—welfare and resources—are unlikely to be moved by
such a position. These camps tend, by and large, to eschew any such sharp
forms of incommensurability.239 And although practical considerations
might lead them to accept boundaries between education and other domains
for purposes of real-world policy decisions, these are unlikely to extend to
restrictions on comparisons and tradeoffs within education, across discrete
areas of skills and learning.
By contrast, a distinguishing feature of the capability camp is precisely
its insistence on an irreducibly plural set of capacities as the relevant foci for
distributive concern, so that distributive principles apply primarily within,
rather than across, such capacities.240 Does this lend support for barring all
composition, held to merit further accommodation by the district court and dissent on appeal, but not by
the majority).
237
See MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1993); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON
(Ruth Chang ed., 1997); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 321 (1986).
238
See supra Part I.B.3.
239
Both camps adopt metrics of advantage that assume, explicitly or implicitly, more or less full
commensurability or fungibility across different goods. To be sure, many welfarists have expressed
theoretical reservations about commensurable—or cardinal and interpersonally comparable—notions of
utility, and such reservations have also played an important part in motivating the development of the
resourcist alternative. Rawls, supra note 121, at 91–92; Arrow, supra note 215, at 246; Harsanyi, supra
note 215, at 309. Nevertheless, for any workable form of the welfare view, some way of making
interpersonal comparisons of utility is needed, and typically such comparisons are made in a cardinal or
“as if” quasi-cardinal fashion, along a single-scale measure of quantitative intensity. See Kaplow, supra
note 215, at 603 (discussing whether metrics can be used to convert resources into a single dimension).
Resourcists, for their part, rely on income and wealth as a fungible, all-purpose means for measuring
social opportunity costs across goods and persons. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
240
Sen, supra note 212; Cohen, supra note 212, at 9; Martha Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations:
The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1199–1203
(1997). Whether this commits capability views to eschew “general” distributive justice—meaning, the
redress of overall or residual forms of disadvantage via generic or fungible means, such as
money—depends on their scope of divergence from resource views, as discussed above in note 230.
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intra-educational tradeoffs, across any areas of skills and learning? Likely
not. Although sphere-specificity between education and other domains such
as health is given stronger support by the capability view (as a matter of
principle, not just practical policy), this is because such boundaries likely
track (even if only roughly) fundamental underlying distinctions between
discrete kinds of human goods. Any such correspondence, however, is
unlikely to obtain within the educational sphere. It is doubtful, that is, that
the large number of different subject areas in which schools regularly assign
educational scores tightly map on to the—typically quite few—capacities
plausibly specified by capability theorists as fundamentally distinct goods
or spaces of concern.241
More plausible is that, stimulated to further theoretical reflection by the
kinds of complex cases presented by disability accommodation, we might
begin to carve out a few core aspects of educational development as going
to distinct, fundamental forms of knowledge and skills, such that each merits
its own, independent valuation for distributive purposes. For those drawn to
this position, suggestive leads in this regard might be provided by those
state-court constitutional decisions that have identified a series of discrete
dimensions of learning, skills and activities, in each of which schools are
charged with ensuring all students are effectively equipped.242
Taking stock, we can now distinguish between three main variants of
the majority position. A pure view rejects eligibility in all three cases,
including type-(A) cases of lopsided development. A first refinement
accepts the need to adjust valuations in cases of lopsided development, but
otherwise sticks to its guns. A second refinement, propelled by
type-(B) cases, accepts a further need to draw lines between fundamentally
distinct, independently valuable, spaces of educational development, and
curb the application of priority principles to within, rather than across, such
spheres.

241
Cf. NUSSBAUM, supra note 122, at 78–79 (within a total of ten irreducibly distinct capability
spaces, specifying four areas plausibly relevant to educational policy, each characterized in very broad
terms: “senses, imagination and thought,” “emotions,” “practical reason,” and “affiliation”).
242
See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, at 877 (W. Va. 1979) (specifying eight dimensions in which
schools must enable students’ development up to their full capacity: literacy, math, creative arts,
knowledge of government, social ethics, self-knowledge, work skills, and recreational pursuits); Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (specifying seven dimensions for
sufficient development: oral and written communication; knowledge of economic, social, and political
systems; understanding of government processes; self-knowledge; arts; academic or vocational training;
academic or vocational skills). As discussed supra Part II.B, the distributive principles these decisions
are most plausibly seen to instantiate—maximin and robust sufficiency, respectively—face serious
drawbacks. However, nothing prevents us from adapting their views and applying instead the principle
of proportionate progress to their conceptions of the appropriate spaces of distributive concern (or to any
suitably revised versions of such conceptions we settle upon after further reflection).
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What, finally, of a fourth position, one that would make further
refinements so as to accommodate type-(C) cases, involving a diffuse effect
of disability across many areas but not one so strong as to make the student
worse off than the average in any specific significant area (due to he or she
having compensating above-average capacities in other respects)? To
embrace this would be to argue for so fine-grained a view of the relevant
spaces of distributive concern as to dovetail with the heart of the minority
position: namely, to adopt a narrowly targeted, disability-specific space for
distributive concern and either to ignore, or to bar tradeoffs against, other,
non-disability-specific sources of advantage and disadvantage.
2. Disability and Other Sources of Educational Disadvantage
What might be the justification for the minority view just stated, one
sometimes going under the label of “disability remediation”?243
Reconstructed as a view of distributive justice, its premises run as
follows: (a) the relevant target space for distributive concern is a narrow,
disability-specific capacity, such that a person with that disability is virtually
by definition relevantly worse off than others, so as to merit distributive
priority; and (b) we should not factor in any other respect in which such a
person may be educationally advantaged or better off, so as to reduce the
degree of priority they should be accorded. Or, in a qualified version
of (b): we should not factor in any non-disability sources of educational
advantage or disadvantage, deeming them irrelevant to the task at hand, of
according distributive priority purely on the basis of disability.
Such a position—of disregarding as irrelevant to distributive concern
any other source of involuntary educational disadvantage (such as
socio-economic status, family context, cultural or linguistic background or
innate differences in ability not classified under disability)—is difficult to
defend in principle.244 And although some more practical considerations
may be marshaled in its favor, none of these is ultimately persuasive.
One might seek to justify restricting our focus to disability-based
sources of disadvantage on the ground that we are working here within a
disability-specific legislative scheme. But it seems inconsistent, even
unprincipled, to advance a robust interpretation of that scheme’s
243
Rowley II, 458 U.S. 176, 215 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem,
690 F.3d. 390, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2012). It bears noting that the label of “disability-remediation” is
somewhat misleading, at least for that variant of the minority position being considered here. Even
adopting the position that students with disability should be eligible for special concern so long as their
disability is not fully remedied, the form that special concern would take here is priority according to the
principle of proportionate progress (applied to the minority’s target space for distributive concern,
namely a narrow, disability-specific capacity). And this distributive principle does not counsel full
remediation, but rather continued priority only so long as the student’s potential for improvement, in the
disability-specific capacity, remains significant enough that her or his proportionate gain in that space
continues to be comparatively greater than that of other potential recipients.
244
In particular, it would find no support from any of the main contending views on the appropriate
locus of distributive concern. See supra Part III.B.2.
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commitments toward students with disability on the basis of an analysis of
distributive justice, but then fail to follow through on that analysis’s
implications when they run in a contrary direction.
A second argument may be that disability tracks particularly salient
forms of educational disadvantage, ones that tend to be especially urgent
compared to other, perhaps more nebulous, sources of disadvantage. Indeed,
it might be thought that with these other sources, unchosen aspects of
advantage and disadvantage entangle more inextricably with factors held
reasonably to lie within students’ personal responsibility, making them less
eligible candidates for redress on most views of distributive fairness. Yet, it
is precisely this salience of the disadvantages from disability—and its
potential for abuse through expansive diagnoses of “disability”—that critics
of IDEA accommodation point to as fostering an unjustified, and potentially
distorting, form of “special treatment.”245 One that unfairly vaults a
particular set of educational disadvantages over others that are, at least in
principle, equally germane.
Finally, disabilities may often pose “extra-educational” hurdles,
i.e., disadvantages outside the educational setting. And so, a third argument
might run, any extra solicitousness shown toward the disadvantages of
disability in educational policy might be justified, or at least excused, on
grounds of partially compensating for these “outside” deficits. The main
trouble246 with this position is that it bumps up against all the reasons
canvassed above for why analysis of the fair distribution of educational
resources should remain internally cabined, restricting its comparisons and
tradeoffs to the domain of educational development.247
To sum up: both the majority and minority positions, in their initial form,
merit reconsideration once we sift them through a more fine-grained analysis
of the appropriate space(s) of distributive concern. The upshot?
Considerable support for one or both of two possible refinements to the
majority view: (a) adjusting our valuations of raw educational scores before
making priority comparisons across students; and (b) drawing distinctions
between discrete spaces of educational development deemed independently
valuable, to restrict the application of priority principles to within, rather
245

See KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 92.
A secondary problem is that some nondisability sources of disadvantage may also present
hurdles outside of education that merit redress.
247
See supra Part I.B.3; supra text accompanying notes 237–242. This is not to say that
extra-educational deficits associated with disability should remain unaddressed; only that they are not
best addressed through the diversion of educational resources as a compensating medium. In this
connection, it bears emphasizing that even after all “sphere-specific” deficits—i.e., deficits in various
individual domains like education and health—have been equitably redressed internally, there may well
be persons who remain in a state of “residual” (unaddressed) or “overall” (composite) disadvantage that
merits further priority, as a matter of “general” distributive justice. This, however, is likely best pursued
through more generic means, such as monetary transfers (leaving open here the question of what
institutional mechanism may be most apt for effecting such transfers).
246
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than across, such zones. Adopting these would take us some way toward the
minority view, but still stop significantly short of it. Further steps in that
direction, so as to single out disability as the sole source of educational
disadvantage meriting distributive concern, would seem unjustified.
CONCLUSION: DISTRIBUTIVE EQUITY IN LAW AND POLICY
What might the principle of proportionate priority mean for other areas
of law and policy besides educational accommodation for disability? To ask
this backs us into a prior question: does distributive justice have any direct
bearing on the modes of analysis used in different areas of law and policy?
This Article has suggested that the answer may be “yes” more often than
is commonly thought. It has done so by tackling the two fundamental
obstacles to the pursuit of distributive equity in law and policy. First, from a
legal-institutional perspective it has shown that, contrary to a common
perception, questions of distributive equity—or of prioritizing across
similarly legitimate claims to resources in order to ensure fair access to a
substantive benefit for all—may not only arise organically, internal to the
distinct concerns of a particular field of law and policy, but also sometimes
lie at its very center. Second, from a philosophical perspective, the Article
has confronted head-on the two fundamental normative questions of
distributive justice—namely, “what is fairness” in access, and “fair access
to what”—by advancing a new principle of distributive equity and
examining its application to different candidate spaces of distributive
concern.
For what other areas of law and policy might these arguments be
germane? Where else, that is, might questions currently viewed through
other lenses—such as antidiscrimination, equality of opportunity, rights,
corrective justice, efficiency or cost-effectiveness—be better conceived as
ones of delimited distributive equity, or fair access to substantive benefits in
accord with claims of distributive priority cabined to that domain? Although
detailed consideration of further applications is clearly beyond our present
scope, a few suggestive illustrations may be ventured—less as definitive
conclusions than as possibly fruitful lines for future inquiry.
Two extensions of the argument, closely adjacent to our central focus
here, may have been glimpsed already: educational justice besides disability
and disability accommodation outside of education. Should educational
justice in general be viewed in terms of distributive equity, with redress
guided by proportionate priority? Doing so would advance distinct answers
to two of the central questions of educational policy, namely: what sources
of educational disadvantage should we seek to redress as a matter
educational equity (e.g., income, minority status, family background, innate
differences in ability not classified under disability); and what distributive
principle should guide our expenditure of resources in pursuing such
redress? A central lesson of the present analysis is that our answers to these
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two are more deeply intertwined than is often thought. Specifically, if, in our
answer to the first question, we reach beyond fair equality of opportunity to
pursue distributive equity—in contrast to one prominent group of
scholars248—then neither of the prominent answers to the second
question—equality or sufficiency249—retains much appeal. Once our focus
shifts, that is, from correcting imperfections to a fair competition for grades
to redressing involuntary barriers accessing to educational development,
then the attractions both of equality (as “leveling the playing field”) and of
sufficiency (as less demanding than equality) fall away. While their
respective drawbacks—implausibility for equality and indeterminacy for
sufficiency—come to the fore. Perhaps more promising than trying to
“blend” the two in an unstable compromise—one unsure in its footing in
underlying principle and indeterminate in practical guidance—is to jettison
both commitments, and adopt in their stead comparative priority.250
How about accommodation of disability outside of education? Should it
enter a new phase, progressing from facial discrimination to discriminatory
disparate impact to, now, inequitable disparate impact? This possibility was
briefly sketched above, where a parallel impasse to the one facing courts
under the IDEA was shown to face courts under the RA and ADA.251 Does
it call for a parallel resolution? Arguably yes, although surely the precise
contours—and even perhaps the general aptness—of the resolution will
depend on the aims specific to the diverse settings of employment, housing,
transportation, architecture, and so forth. In one setting, however, we can be
confident of strong parallels: health. As in education, so in health our aim is
to secure effective access to a substantive good of fundamental importance.
And again, persons with disability are differentially-situated in respect of
that aim on account of a conversion deficit, in translating a given bundle of
248
Jencks, supra note 121, at 520; Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift, Putting Educational Equality
in Its Place, 3 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 444, 445–46 (2008).
249
See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 345–47
(2006) (reviewing debate between equality and sufficiency views); William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When
“Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters,
56 EMORY L.J. 545, 606–13 (2006) (arguing for equality against sufficiency); Joshua Weishart,
Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 478–79 (2014) (reviewing debate
between equality and sufficiency views).
250
See Liu, supra note 249, at 345–47 (offering a blend of equality and sufficiency); Weishart,
supra note 249, 478–479 (offering a blend of equality and sufficiency). Notably, neither Professors Liu
nor Weishart focus on what this Article identifies as the fundamental difficulties facing equality and
sufficiency views—namely, the basic implausibility of equalizing-as-sameness in matters of distribution
and the under- or over-inclusive difficulties stemming from sufficiency’s eschewal of a comparative
focus. Underpinning both authors’ discussions is their acceptance of the equation of a comparative focus
with the aim of equalizing—an equation that, as discussed in supra note 161, is common to the
philosophical literature more generally and which, of course, it has been the central thrust of the present
argument to pry apart.
251
See supra text accompanying notes 102–07.
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means (healthcare) into valuable ends (positive health outcomes). So our
task, again, is to correct for the insensitivity of any merely formal equality
to their special needs. And in so doing there is no plausible alternative to
tackling it as a question of distributive equity, of prioritizing across similarly
legitimate claims to healthcare—the special needs of those with disability
and the needs of other patients—to ensure equitable access to health for all.
Ensuring equitable access to health for all, more generally, points to a
significant third extension. Persons with disability represent only one subset
of a larger group of individuals with “differential needs” in health—others
include patients with pre-existing conditions or “high risk” individuals more
generally. A cornerstone of many healthcare reforms at the state and federal
level in recent decades has been to ensure access to healthcare for such
individuals, via guaranteed enrollment in private plans or expanded
eligibility for public ones, alongside assurance that they receive, under such
plans, non-discriminatory and “adequate” coverage for their individual
healthcare needs.252 At the same time such reforms typically retain, as part
of their mandate to keep costs under control, the use of “reasonable” cost
containment methods, including cost-sensitive screening of different
categories of care and courses of treatment.253 This poses in sharp form a
dilemma long playing a central, if often underground, role in healthcare
policy: at what point does a course of treatment, while providing some
medical benefit to the patient, nevertheless provide too small a benefit at too
great a cost to qualify for coverage? Recourse to the notions commonly
deployed—of facial discrimination, discriminatory disparate impact,
“actuarial fairness,” “medical necessity,” and cost-effectiveness—are
unlikely to be of much help in satisfactorily resolving it. Just as with the
subset of patients with disability, so with the larger group of those with
differential needs: the only plausible approach is one sounding in
distributive equity. And among distributive principles, only proportionate
priority attends simultaneously to both access and cost sides of the problem.
Indeed, a central message of the proportionate priority view is its
insistence that neither the “access” nor the “cost” dimensions of a problem
can be addressed independently of the other. Equitable access, that is,
integrates the two in a way making it indistinguishable from an analysis of
equitable opportunity cost. The upshot of such an analysis—applicable to a
wide range of fields—is to give clear articulation in law and policy to what

252
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. (2012);
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); An Act Providing Access to
Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 2006 Mass. Acts ch. 58, § 1; Individual Health Coverage,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M (2006).
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should be our deepest commitments of principle: enabling all persons to
have their lives go as well as is possible and fair.
AFTERWORD: ENDREW—SIGNS OF HOPE, MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
Shortly after this Article was completed, the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in the Endrew case referred to above,254 involving a
challenge to the Tenth Circuit’s minimalist interpretation of the “some
benefit” standard deriving from Rowley.255 This Afterword briefly evaluates,
from the vantage of the argument set forth in this Article, the implications
of Endrew for educational accommodation in this country.
In an unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court’s
decision in Endrew consisted primarily of three planks: (a) an affirmation of
Rowley’s insistence that the IDEA’s requirements for a satisfactory IEP do
indeed contain a strong substantive component;256 (b) a rejection of both
minimalist and maximalist views of when such substantive benefits should
be deemed “adequate” for purposes of the IDEA,257 which the Court also
took Rowley to stand for;258 and (c) the articulation of a new “appropriate
progress” standard for evaluating the adequacy of benefits,259 one ostensibly
distinct from either the “some” or “meaningful” benefit standards that had
been widely taken to be the prevailing options in the wake of Rowley.260
254

See supra text accompanying notes 4, 43, 84–85.
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 997–98 (2017).
256
Id.
257
Id. at 992, 997–99.
258
Id. at 995–96.
259
See id. at 999 (“To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.”); see also id. (“[T]he progress contemplated by the IEP must be appropriate in light of
the child’s circumstances . . . .”); id. at 1001 (“The IDEA demands more [than merely exceeding de
minimis benefits]. It requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”).
260
Three points bear noting regarding the relationship of Endrew’s “appropriate progress” standard
to Rowley. First, the Endrew Court took the view that Rowley did not articulate any standard, emphasizing
in this regard Rowley’s statement that it “declined to establish any one test for determining the adequacy
of educational benefits.” Id. at 997. Although the Endrew Court cited this statement in rejection of the
Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of Rowley as having articulated a “some” benefit standard (an interpretation
shared by a majority of circuits), the Court’s rebuke would also seemingly apply to that minority of
circuits, most prominently the Third, that have derived a “meaningful” benefit standard from Rowley
(this latter went unmentioned by the Court). For a review of the longstanding pedigree, amongst both
circuit courts and commentators, of the derivation of the “some” and “meaningful” standards from
Rowley, see supra Part I.A. Second, the Endrew Court offered its “appropriate progress” standard as
simply an elaboration of Rowley, being a more concrete specification of the “general approach” that
Rowley and the IDEA already “point[ed] to.” Id. at 999. Nevertheless, and third, it is clear that,
substantively, the “appropriate progress” standard is more demanding in its requirements than the more
minimalist “some benefit” interpretation of Rowley. The latter’s relation to more demanding versions of
the “meaningful benefit” interpretation remains, at present, unclear.
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In respect of each of its first two prongs, the Court’s decision is a
welcome clarion call moving forward. Both of these elements—namely,
reaffirmation of a substantive view of the IDEA’s requirements and rejection
of both minimalist and maximalist views of these—find strong support in
the analysis given above.261
In its articulation of a new standard, however, the Court’s performance
was more mixed. On the one hand, the Court’s standard may be seen to
dovetail with the one advanced in the preceding pages: that students with
disabilities should be enabled to realize “appropriate progress” may be
thought to fit hand in glove with the view that they be enabled to realize
“proportionate progress.” What is “appropriate,” the Court declared, is a
matter of what is “reasonable” in “light of the child’s circumstances.”262 And
while the Court did not specify how “reasonably” to factor in students’
diverse circumstances, proportionate progress steps in to fill precisely that
gap—by offering a view of what is reasonable in terms of what is fair across
students, so that “appropriateness” is determined by looking to two sets of
comparative circumstances: how well each student is already faring and by
how much each stands to improve.
However, on the other hand, it must be admitted that not only did the
Court not say this, but it also did not say much of anything at all. It is not
just that the Court left unstated how to weigh or evaluate those
circumstances it deemed relevant to factor in; it did not even pinpoint which
aspects of students’ circumstances it deemed relevant to consider in the first
place. What lies behind these silences? A fundamental lack of clarity, once
again, on what our basic aim here should be. As with the “some” or
“meaningful” standards, so here we need to ask: “appropriate” in light of
what end? In pursuit of what guiding ideal, given which underlying
commitments?
The commitments underlying the proportionate progress are, of course,
anchored in a specific conception of distributive fairness, of what it means
to give all students equitable access to a substantive benefit, educational
development. But the Court in Endrew, despite its clear embrace of a
substantive view of the IDEA’s requirements, shied away from articulating
this—or any other—guiding ideal to orient its efforts in meeting those
requirements. As a result, its new standard faces difficulties parallel to those
long plaguing the some and meaningful yardsticks it replaces: (a) not only
is the language used to couch the standard quite vague—“appropriate” not
being much of an improvement over “some” or “meaningful” in this

261

For the first element, see supra text accompanying notes 30–32 and 73–78; for the second,
see supra Parts II.A.1–3.
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Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 992.
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respect;263 (b) but also, more importantly, absent any orienting purpose, we
lack guidance on how to make the standard’s language more determinate in
application, whether by resolving ambiguities through direct appeal to our
underlying commitments or, even, by identifying serviceable proxy factors
that may render it more workable in practice.264
The Court’s reticence in this regard is surely the greatest missed
opportunity of the decision, a failure to meet the challenge set out over thirty
years ago in Rowley: namely, to articulate an ideal that captures our
“complex aspirations” under the IDEA, where both “equality of
opportunity” and “equality of outcome” fail.265 That ideal, this Article has
argued, is “equity of access”: reaching beyond all procedural concerns to
focus directly on access to substantive benefits, it jettisons any commitment
to equalizing, aiming instead to ensure all students fair access. Neither
procedural nor substantive equality, our aspiration should be to achieve
substantive equity, understood as a matter of distributive justice.

263

Thus, if we substituted the terms “appropriate,” “some,” or “meaningful” for each other in the
following, there would not seem to be any appreciable gain or loss in precision: “Each student must be
enabled to realize ____ progress, that which is reasonable in light of the child’s circumstances.”
264
For discussion of the parallel difficulties facing existing standards, see supra Part I.A.1.
265
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.

